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This thesis examines the role of civil society in shaping democratic civil-military 
relations (CMR) through several political transitions in Nepal, with an emphasis on the 
current period. Since its first experience with democracy in 1950, the king interrupted 
Nepal’s pursuit of consolidation until the political revolution of 2006; afterwards, 
democratic consolidation at the official level has revolved around seeking consensus 
among the political leaders. This over-focus has led to incomplete consolidation and 
weakened the formal democratic institutions of control. 
Civil society, on the other hand, has played a variety of roles to greater effect 
during consolidation, including military affairs and CMR. This thesis analyzes the 
contributions of three selected civil society groups—the media, Nagarik Samaj, and 
human rights organizations—to democratic civilian control of the security forces. This 
thesis finds that despite civil society’s focus on political activities, it has significantly 
influenced and helped in shaping effective democratic CMR during Nepal’s transition to 
democracy. However, civil society’s further assistance is required in writing the 
constitution to drive the country toward the completion of the consolidation, which will 
ultimately shape strong democratic CMR. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nepal’s quest for a consolidated democracy has ebbed and flowed amid political 
changes and instability for more than six decades. Nepal failed to realize its democratic 
aspirations in the 1950s, when the king curtailed the experiment with pluralist politics 
within a decade. Thereafter, Nepal formed a party-less political system (the panchayat), 
under a monarchy, which lasted for three decades until the People’s Movement forced the 
king to step down. Even then, the restoration of democracy in 1990 also witnessed a 
string of upheavals, including civil war, until the political revolution of 2006.1  
These political transitions resulted in new leaders in the government with 
different political ideologies, and they practiced new mechanisms of control that 
obstructed the establishment of smooth civil-military relations (CMR). It is perhaps too 
much to say that the development of Nepal’s CMR is at an impasse, but the situation 
could use direction and guidance from sources outside the echelons of the politicians and 
the senior military leadership. Civil society, with the essential function of “intermediation 
between state and citizens”2 in a democracy, may be the solution.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Nepal Army (NA) has neither attempted a coup nor created problems for any 
of the new governments established after each political change.3 However, after the 
revolutionary movement of 2006, the NA struggled to adjust to the new circumstances 
because, as Ole R. Holsti argues, it was “greatly challenged to address many conflicting 
demands from Nepal’s political parties and civil society.”4  
1 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, ed, Nepal in Transition: From 
People’s War to Fragile Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–2. 
2 Christoph Spunk, “Understanding Civil Society,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical 
Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholf (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 21. 
3 Nihar Nayak, “The Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” in India’s Neighborhood: The Armies of South 
Asia, ed. Vishal Chandra (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012), 97. 
4 “Nepalese Civil Military Issues Politics Essay,” UK Essays (November 2013), 
http://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/nepalese-civil-military-issues-politics-essay.php .  
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Often, the interests of newly emerging political leaders contrasted with the 
military’s norms and values. The political decision to integrate former Maoist combatants 
into the armed forces stirred controversy because the NA was asked to accept the 
politically motivated cadres whom they had fought as enemies for years. Indeed, initially 
the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) (UCPM)5 demanded the integration of 
all 32,000 of its registered combatants into the national army, but some other political 
parties disagreed with the proposal. Ultimately, a total of 1,460 combatants joined the 
NA, among them 71 officers.6 It was a tall order for the NA; as Nihar Nayak claims, “the 
NA initially took a rigid position on the integration issue.”7 Moreover, the sudden 
transformation of the NA’s command under civilian authorities from the royal palace also 
created confusion. As Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba claim, because the NA “has 
never been seriously indoctrinated in the concept of the supremacy of a civilian 
authority,”8 this unsettled state was natural, if not exactly comfortable.  
Under these circumstances, in addition to the government’s effort to establish 
strong CMR, Nepal needs positive contributions from other democratic institutions, 
including civil society. As a volunteer service, the NA lacks proportional representation 
from the population, and some members of society still perceive the military as better 
serving the upper class rather than the nation as a whole.9 This viewpoint and the 
practices that inform it have created a gap between the military and society in Nepal.  
Nepali and Subba claim that “all of the army chiefs so far [before the Shah 
Dynasty was abolished] have come from families with an aristocratic/military family 
background.”10 In contrast, the top leadership of major parties “consists almost 
exclusively of hill Brahmins, especially eastern Nepal, whose caste-based occupation, 
being priests and astrologers, did not … [give them a] dominant role in the original 
5 Initially this party was known as Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M).  
6 Prashant Jha, “One Country Two Armies’ Situation Ends in Nepal,” Hindu, October 3, 2012.   
7 Nayak, “Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” 97. 
8 Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba, “Civil-Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 16, no. 1(2005): 88.  
9 Nayak, “Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” 110. 
10 Nepali and Subba, “Civil-Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 89. 
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military-class dominant power structure of Nepal.”11 Moreover, Nepali and Subba quote 
the former prime minister of Nepal B. P. Koirala: “There is a lack of empathy for the 
military among key segments of the Nepalese political establishment.”12 Thus, Nepal has 
peculiar political circumstances, in which the groups of people from the particular castes 
and ethnicities who dominate the current political leadership are under-represented in the 
military’s senior ranks and vice-versa. This ethnic and caste legacy appears to be one of 
the reasons for the persistent friction in Nepal’s CMR. 
Furthermore, the power struggle among political parties and the ensuing political 
instability has stretched out the transitional phase of the democratic consolidation in 
Nepal. Currently, the Constitutional Assembly (CA) is crafting a new constitution, and 
each stakeholder is seeking to define its role in the new democratic era. The constitution 
will determine the security policy and the NA’s future role, which has great implications 
for civilian control. Because the military, as the government’s security tool, must rely on 
its (civilian) political masters’ decisions, civil society could effectively serve as a neutral 
voice among the conflicting ideologies of the various political parties involved in the 
constitutional process.  
Thus, it is essential to analyze the role of civil society in military affairs during 
the democratic consolidation. Therefore, this thesis focuses on whether and how civil 
society has helped to shape democratic civilian control during the political transitions in 
Nepal.     
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The NA remained mainly under the direct control of the king since its inception, 
which kept the military away from civilian authorities. As a result, CMR in Nepal has 
remained nascent. The reemergence of democracy in 2006 further complicated this issue. 
11 Nepali and Subba, “Civil-Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 89. 
12 Ibid. 
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Indeed, the first democratically elected post-war government collapsed13 over the issue 
of military control; “since then, political life has been unstable, and policy making has 
been largely paralyzed.”14  
Meanwhile, civil society in Nepal played a meaningful role in the peaceful 
conversion of the Maoist conflict to a pluralist democracy. In particular, such civil 
society groups including Nagarik Samaj,15 human rights organizations, and media 
actively participated in this process. As Dev Raj Dahal claims, in addition to generating 
pressure to begin the peace process, Nepal’s civil society “also acted as watchdogs and 
agents of social protection of vulnerable sections of society.”16  Furthermore, as Karan 
Barbes and Peter Albrecht point out, civil society can participate fruitfully by “defining 
security policies and overseeing the structures and practices of security sector actors.”17  
Two instances demonstrate significant contributions from Nepal’s civil society. 
First, the representatives of Nagarik Samaj established a communication link between the 
democratically elected government and the Maoists insurgents, mediated the peace talks, 
and pressured both groups to negotiate for a political solution.18 Second, during the 
political movement against the “king’s coup” of 2005, the media was key in limiting 
13 The prime minister of the Maoist-led government resigned in May 2009 after the president 
overruled its decision to sack Chief of the Nepal Army. See Muni, S.D, “State, Army, and the Aam Admi,” 
in Soldiers and States: A symposium on civil-military relations in South Asia, Seminar #611, (July 2010), 
accessed on March 5, 2015, http://www.india-seminar.com/2010/611.htm. 
14 Von Einsiedel, Malone, and Pradhan, Nepal in Transition, 2.  
15“The rise of civil society—a concept usually translated in Nepali as nagarik samaj, or nijamati 
samaj, as proposed by the late academic Saubhagya Shah—has been a highly significant phenomenon in 
Nepal over the last two decades. Since 1990, the country has seen an efflorescence of countless movements 
and organizations associated with social change at local, regional and national levels.” Gérard Toffin 
“Crucible of Civil Society,” Ekantipur.com, March 31, 2014. Shaubhagya Shah asserts, “In Nepali 
language, nagarik samaj has been adopted as the standard equivalent for the English term ‘civil society.’ 
Literally, however, nagarik samaj refers to ‘citizens’ society.’ A more accurate translation for civil society 
in Nepali is nijamati samaj. This usage has not been adopted probably because nijamati (civil) has been 
reserved for civil service.” See Saubhagya Shah, Civil Society in Uncivil Places: Soft State and Regime 
Change in Nepal (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2008). 
16 Dev Raj Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal: Their Roles in Conflict and Peace Building 
(Kathmandu: Support for Peace and Development Initiative, UNDP, 2006), 20. 
17 Karan Barbes and Peter Albrecht, “Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender.” In 
Gender and Security Sector Reform Tool Kit, ed. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek. (Geneva: DCAF, 
OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 2.  
18 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 20. 
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government reprisals against the movement. As Saubhagya Shah claims, “The intense 
and adverse glare of media on the security forces at the street level appears to have 
demoralized and incapacitated them.”19 In this event, the security forces had to remain in 
a defensive position.20 Finally, civil society—through mediating, monitoring, and 
pressuring the government and the Maoists—contributed to a peaceful settlement and 
defused the armed conflict. It also forced the king to step down and hand over executive 
authority to the democratic government. 
Nepal’s political transition has gained attention from the international community 
because it set an example for peaceful transformation of a Maoist conflict. In this 
connection, Nepal was largely self-liberating, which placed its democratic consolidation 
on a solid footing. On the other hand, an unsuccessful CMR transformation might undo 
Nepal’s democratic progress and possibly generate a violent conflict. Thus, the 
importance of this thesis lies in its understanding of the Nepalese politico-social 
environment. It will also contribute to opening up a broader view of civil society’s 
contributions to strengthening CMR in Nepal.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Available literature on CMR in Nepal mainly focuses on the relationship between 
the civilian authorities and the military, but it seldom discusses civil society’s role. 
Moreover, most of the literature on civil society in Nepal focuses on the political 
development of the country, not on military affairs. A few research papers cover CMR in 
Nepal, which are more focused on identifying the reasons for friction in CMR and 
problems of civilian control. 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan consider civil society an essential part of 
democratic consolidation because it “can destroy a non-democratic regime”21 and assist 
the democratization process. They consider civil society as one of the most important 
19 Shah, Civil Society in Uncivil Places, 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 8.  
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arenas of a democracy, and note that “[it] generates ideas and helps monitor the state’s 
apparatus.”22 However, as Dev Raj Dahal comments, “the roles of civil society groups … 
have not been adequately discussed in both academic writings and policy analysis in 
Nepal.”23 This thesis will endeavor to fill this gap in the literature by identifying civil 
society’s role of enhancing civilian control in a nascent democratic environment.  
1. Theoretical Aspects of Civil-Military Relations 
CMR consists of more than the relationship between the military and the 
government. As Peter D. Feaver claims, CMR encompasses an “entire range of 
relationships between the military and civilian society at every level.”24 The fundamental 
basis of CMR in a democratic system lies in establishing civilian authority over the 
military. Richard H. Kohn claims that civilian control is established when “all decisions 
of the government, including national security, are to be made or approved by officials 
outside the professional armed forces.”25 According to Kohn, the success of a democratic 
system rests on the establishment of civilian control because “while a country may have 
civilian control of the military without democracy, it cannot have democracy without 
civilian control.”26  
As elected representatives, civilians have a responsibility to decide on behalf of 
the people; the military should obey because, as Peater D. Feaver writes, “civilians have a 
right to be wrong.”27 Moreover, civilian control should be augmented by a check and 
balance mechanism to ensure that the military is protecting the society, and the society is 
also being protected from the military.28 However, Kohn and Feaver do not consider the 
22 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 14.  
23 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 3. 
24 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 
211. 
25 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 
142. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntingdon, Janowitz, and the Question of 
Civilian Control.” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 154. 
28 Ibid, 151–52. 
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complex circumstances of a country like Nepal, where political leaders are ideologically 
divided. The presence of parties ranging from democratic to extreme communist in 
Nepal’s CA creates division among political leader’s principles. It has also created a 
situation where political leaders’ views on military affairs are often contradictory. 
Therefore, in Nepal’s crucial moment of establishing control through the constitution, 
civil society can mediate to balance the contradictions by giving independent 
perspectives and cautioning the leaders from making incorrect decisions.  
In addition to constitutional provisions, monitoring mechanisms also enhance 
civilian control. Feaver argues that such mechanisms bring military activities into the 
public arena to ensure that the armed forces remain within a given boundary because, “in 
the face of a global norm supporting democratic traditions, it always costs the military 
more to disobey in public than to do so in private.”29 On the other hand, Florina Cristiana 
Matei points out the necessity of oversight of state and government activities because the 
state could also abuse power. She writes: “Media inform the citizenry and help to shape 
public opinion,”30 which, in turn, can generate “fire alarms” that force the executive and 
legislative bodies to investigate and reform laws and policies.
31  
Similarly, Caparini and Fluri claim the “free press helps to compensate when 
other formal oversight bodies fail or decline to address abuses and can draw public 
attention to those abuses.”
32
 Nepal’s interim constitution has provisions for the National 
Defense Council (NDC) and special parliamentary committee as formal democratic 
institutions to monitor military affairs.33 As an informal institution, Nepal’s civil society, 
including the media, has been successful in arousing public opinion on several issues; 
their effectiveness is questionable though. 
29 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 229.    
30 Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” International Journal 
of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 27, no. 1 (2014), 78. 
31 Ibid, 100. 
32 Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri, “Civil Society Actors in Defence and Security Affairs,” in Civil 
Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies, ed. Marina Caparini, Philipp 
Fluri, and Ferenc Molnar, (Geneva: DCAF, 2006), 6. 
33 Bishnu Pathak, “Civil-Military Relations: Nepalese Context,” in Contemporary Nepal, ed. B. C. 
Upreti and Uddhab Pd. Pyakurel (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2012), 68. 
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The creation of strong democratic institutions establishes civilian authority over 
the military; and the ministry of defense (MOD) and the legislature are the appropriate 
entities to achieve this goal. Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze argue for creating a 
strong MOD under a civilian minister to function “as [a] buffer between politics and the 
armed forces.”34 According to them, by channeling all military affairs, the MOD works 
as a “core element in contemporary democratic civil-military relations”35 and establishes 
control by structuring power relationships and defining the responsibilities of the military 
along with the governing authorities.36  
On the other hand, Jeanne Kinney Giraldo argues that the legislature’s role in the 
policy-making process balances the military and society because parliament represents all 
sectors of the population. It establishes effective civilian control by formulating defense 
policy, controlling budgets, and monitoring their implementation.37 These methods, as 
Giraldo notes, “enhance the accountability, quality, transparency, and legitimacy”38 of all 
military activities, and establish effective civilian control. However, Matei argues that 
CMR should not be described in terms of the control of the military only. She presents a 
three-part concept of CMR: 1) “democratic civilian control of the security forces,” 2) 
“effectiveness of the security forces in fulfilling their assigned roles,” and 3) “efficiency, 
that is, fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost.”39 According to 
Matei, control is established through democratic institutional mechanisms, oversight, and 
effectiveness.40 These concepts, however, do not explain how to deal with friction that 
may appear between the military and the government—especially in a state like Nepal, 
34 Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard B. Goetze, Jr, “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control,” in 
Who Guards the Guardians: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. 
Tollefson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), 79. 
35 Ibid, 71.  
36 Ibid, 78–80. 
37 Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons,” in Who Guards 
the Guardians: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed.Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), 35.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 26. 
40 Ibid, 30. 
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with functioning democratic institutions (MOD, parliament) but with a persistent problem 
of control.  
Morris Janowitz argues for making the military a “mirror of the society” and 
claims that civilian control is best achieved through the “civilianization of the military.”41 
He argues for developing the armed forces as a part of the society, incorporating civilian 
values, and making it more inclusive. Janowitz claims that once the military considers 
itself as a part of the society, it does not operate against society’s interests, and 
“meaningful integration with civilian values”42  guarantees civilian control—at least in 
the mid-20th–century American model on which he bases his argument. However, he 
does not explain the role of civil society in the process of social integration of the 
military. Janowitz further advocates the concept of citizen soldiers, which incorporates 
proper social representation, and fulfills the required number of soldiers through 
conscription.
43
 He also posits this concept as a “formula for civilian political control and 
political legitimacy of the military.”
44
  
In contrast to Janowitz, Samuel P. Huntington propagates objective and subjective 
civilian control. The concept of objective civilian control serves to maximize military 
professionalism, because Huntington claims that a professional force obeys civilian 
leaders as a result of its military character and discipline. This concept argues for 
providing autonomy to the military organization and keeping it separated from the 
political activities of the country.45 On the other hand, Huntington’s subjective civilian 
control prefers “maximizing civilian power … by minimizing the military’s power.”46 It 
establishes control through such mechanisms as government institutions, social class, and 
41 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971), 427. 
42 Ibid, 420. 
43 Morris Janowitz, “The Citizen Soldier and National Service,” Air University Review (Nov–Dec 
1979): 1, 4. 
44 Ibid, 4. 
45 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 1957), 81–83. 
46 Ibid. 
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constitutional form.47 However, Huntington’s subjective civilian control focuses on 
military control with no regard to effectiveness.  
Huntington and Janowitz’s theories have been criticized by many authors. Kohn 
argues that the mechanism of objective control “decreases civilian control over military 
affairs”48 because it complicates the issue of dividing responsibilities between military 
and civilian authorities. The ever-changing nature of war creates disagreements over 
“where to divide [a line between] authority and responsibility”49 of the military. 
Moreover, Feaver claims that “neither Huntington nor Janowitz adequately explain the 
problem of civilian control and so both are uncertain guides for future study and 
policymaking.”50  
Arguably, Nepal is not just beginning to create a control mechanism as assumed 
by Huntington and Janowitz; rather it needs to establish the civilian authority over the 
military that remained in isolated under the king’s control for many years. It already has a 
different mechanism in practice that either needs to be modified to meet a changed 
political scenario or create a new mechanism to strengthen civilian control. 
2. Understanding Civil-Military Relations in Nepal  
Although the armed forces of Nepal have never staged a coup, CMR has remained 
a challenge since the establishment of democracy in Nepal. Ganga Bahadur Thapa and 
Jan Sharma claim, “There has been an uninterrupted relation of mistrust and suspicion 
between the political leadership and the military since the very first democratic 
opening.”51 Similarly, Dhruba Kumar argues that civilian leadership did not realize 
Nepal’s need for the institutionalization of its control mechanisms and oversight agencies 
to ensure civilian control, making CMR crucial. Kumar quotes Nepal’s first-ever 
democratically elected Prime Minister Bishweshowar P. Koirala: “[The] most ominous 
47 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80–81. 
48 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 143. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematic,” 150. 
51 Ganga Bahadur Thapa and Jan Sharma, “Democracy Building and Changing Role of the Nepal 
Military,” Indian Journal of Political Science 71, no. 3 (July–September, 2010): 969. 
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blunder committed by us was the neglect of the army…. We never tried to democratize 
the army.”52 This statement refers to when King Mahendra’s abrupt dismissal of 
Koirala’s government in 1960 and imprisonment of the erstwhile prime minister. The NA 
stood with the king. The incident created a problem between the civilian authorities and 
the military that continues to overshadow civilian perceptions of the NA. 
Institutionalization of democratic mechanisms establishes strong civilian control. 
David Lutterbeck writes that “‘the more institutionalized the security establishment is, the 
more willing it will be to disengage from power.’”53 This process did not happen in the 
case of Nepal. Bishnu Pathak criticizes the post-1990 government for not seeking proper 
ownership of the national army even after bringing it under the government’s control. He 
argues, “[the government] could not democratize the Nepal Army, but stopped further 
recruitment and tried to restrict the [NA], encouraging the Nepal Police by allocating 
more resources to them.”54 In other words, the government did not transform the 
traditional culture of the NA in accord with democratic norms; rather the new leadership 
treated the army badly, which further increased the mistrust and miscommunication 
between the civilian authorities and military leaders.  
Rhoderick Chalmer sees this disagreement as both longer standing and deeper 
running. He analyzes the aspects of ideologies and institutional culture in the military and 
the civilian authorities of Nepal and posits that the cultural differences between the two 
institutions are the main cause of conflict.55 Chalmer claims that the NA considers itself 
as a “most dedicated and professional servant of the nation. In contrast, it saw the 
political parties as weak, divided, self-interested, and incapable of defending national 
interests.”56 Such perceptions also generated a friction in CMR. 
52 Dhruba Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” in Changing Security Dynamics in Nepal, 
ed. Rajan Bhattarai and Rosy Cave (London: Safer World, 2009), 135. 
53 Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces 
and Society 39 (January 2013): 31.   
54 Pathak, “Civil-Military Relations: Nepalese Context,” 64. 
55 Roderick Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” in Nepal in Transition: From People’s 
War to Fragile Peace, ed. Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 61. 
56 Ibid. 
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The NA came under the direct command and control of civilian leadership after 
the political transition in 2006, but the issue of civilian control remained critical because 
of conflicting ideologies among the political parties. According to Sudhir Sharma, the 
issue of military control became more controversial when the president overruled the 
government’s decision to sack the chief of the NA in 2009. There was no king to bargain 
with; political leaders themselves were divided in two groups, and they made the issue of 
control of the armed forces into a political agenda item. Sharma claims that the 
president’s actions raised a question: who controls the NA, the executive prime minister 
or the ceremonial president? According to Sharma, the democratic government failed to 
exert effective control, though it does not identify just how such control might have been 
fostered.57  
The International Crisis Group Asia criticizes the NA for its role in the unstable 
relations with governing authorities. Specifically, it charges that the NA “has resisted 
both external control and internal reform,”58 and it names the NA as the main driver of 
poor CMR in Nepal. The argument is not fully convincing because the NA has reformed 
its organizational norms in accordance with political change, including democratization 
and pluralism. Indeed, Nayak appreciates the NA’s acceptance of a new political system, 
and he emphasizes that “the NA is not known to have tried to take advantage of the 
fragile political situation in the country.”59 The CMR glass may thus be half empty or 
half full, depending on which analyst describes it. The outstanding question remains how 
Nepal should go about strengthening its civil-military relations so that they best serve the 
nation and its democratic consolidation. 
3. Understanding the Role of Civil Society in General 
Christoph Spunk highlights the importance of citizens’ involvement in the 
decision-making process, and argues that people’s participation in democratic system 
57 Sudhir Sharma, ed. Nepali Sena: Nagarik Niyantranka Chaunati [Nepalese Army: Challenges on 
Civilian Control] (Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2010), 2.  
58 International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?” Asia Report, no. 173 (August 13, 
2009), 15. 
59 Nayak, “Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” 97. 
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should be more than voting. Spunk presents Merkel and Lauth’s functional model, which 
determines that civil society “must ensure a balance between central authority and social 
network… in order to control, limit, and influence the activities of the state.”60 However, 
Spunk does not explain how to achieve the desired goal; the pressure from civil society 
can compel the state to revert from its unconstitutional actions. Nepal’s civil society has 
acted in a similar way, as Roderick Chalmers claims, “[W]hen political parties struggled 
to respond to the royal coup of February 2005 … it was civil society pressure that paved 
the way for talks that hammered out the roadmap for conflict settlement.”61 It transferred 
the conflict to a negotiated resolution between the king and the political parties.  
Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri argue for civil society’s role “in the oversight 
of government decision-making and behavior in security affairs,”62 and they consider 
“civilian expertise” as a vital element in establishing democratic control. Their civilian 
expertise includes all kinds of groups such as “academic institutes, professional 
associations, human rights … journalists, and non-governmental organizations.”63 
According to Caparini and Fluri, those groups perform their role by evaluating, 
analyzing, and challenging the government’s policy on military affairs, and also 
articulating public consultation on major issues such as security strategy or policy 
review.64 Because Nepal relies on congressional committees rather than civilian expertise 
for policy formation processes, this concept opens new dynamics for civil society in the 
Nepalese context. 
Ferenc Molnar claims that non-governmental actors and a dynamic civil society 
have several positive implications: such actors improve civilian control, prevents “further 
alienation” of the general public from the military, and improve the social integration of 
60 Spunk, “Understanding Civil Society,” 21. 
61 Roderick Chalmers, “Nepal: From Conflict to Consolidating a Fragile Peace,” in Civil Society and 
Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholf (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 
260. 
62 Caparini and Fluri, “Civil Society Actors in Defence and Security Affairs,” 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, 5–6. 
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the military.65 Philippe C. Schmitter concurs that “the presence of a civil society … 
contributes positively to the consolidation (and, later, to the persistence) of 
democracy.”66 On the other hand, some scholars have claimed that the role of civil 
society cannot be generalized, and its implications and effectiveness depend on other 
relevant factors.  
Krishna Hachhethu argues: “The core notion of civil society varies from one 
world to another.”67  Unlike advanced democracies, as Hachhethu claims, civil society in 
new democracies cannot maintain an apolitical nature, which might bound its activities in 
favor of a particular group’s interest.68 In such a case, civil society could not maintain a 
balance between the state and the society and work independently. Hachhethu presents 
two facets of Nepal’s civil society. On one hand, he questions the independence and 
autonomy of civil society; on the other hand, he praises civil society’s role in resisting the 
state.69 Although Hachhethu’s arguments are mostly focused on civil society’s role in 
political development, not on the issues of CMR, it raises a question about the capability 
and effectiveness of Nepal’s civil society.  
Yanyong Innanchai claims that “the active role of civil society in civil-military 
relations help to control the military only in certain circumstances, depending on context 
and the political agendas of participating civil society.”70 In his dissertation on “The 
Roles of the Legislature and Civil Society in Civil-Military Relations,” Innanchai 
compares five different countries: South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Venezuela, and 
Thailand to analyze the role of civil society in strengthening CMR. He highlights the 
possibility of two different situations eventuating: “Civil society may be able to prevent 
65 Ferenc Molnar, “Civil Society and Democratic Civil-Military Relations—The Case of Hungary,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002): xi. 
66 Philippe C. Schmitter, Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy 
(Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien, 1993), 4. 
67 Krishna Hachhethu, “Civil Society and Political Participation,” in Nepal: Quest for Participatory 
Democracy, ed. L. R. Baral (New Delhi: Adroit, 2006), 1. 
68 Ibid, 3. 
69 Ibid, 10. 
70 Yanyong Innanchai, “The Roles of the Legislature and Civil Society in Civil-Military Relations,” 
(PhD diss, Northern Illinois University, 2012), 303.  
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the military from conducting a coup or act as deterrence … [or] civil society may instead 
act as catalyst or as a supporter of a military coup in overthrowing elected 
governments.”71 However, Innanchai asserts civil society’s roles in providing oversight 
of the “conduct of military/defense issues are mostly beneficial.”72  Hence, this thesis 
will endeavor to explore the contributions and roles of civil society in a Nepalese context. 
4. Understanding Civil Society in Nepal  
The concept of civil society in Nepal is a new phenomenon, but it has already 
proven to be an effective tool to control the governing authority because, as Chandra Dev 
Bhatta claims, “society rather than the state is the legitimate source of power.”73 Bhatta 
argues that the involvement of civil society in state affairs contributes to social inclusion 
and establishes lasting peace.74 Similarly, Hachhethu asserts that civil society has raised 
issues of accountability, transparency, and the proper use of power and resources by the 
government.75  
Saubhagya Shah appreciates civil society’s role during the peaceful 
transformation of Maoist insurgents as mainstream politicians and citizens. He claims 
that without civil society’s influence, “restoring the political legitimacy and acceptability 
of the Maoist party” would not have been possible, because the Maoists were denounced 
“as a terrorist organization by the parliamentary parties and the United States.”76 Civil 
society’s mediating role during the peace talks with Maoist insurgents had generated 
strong pressure on the political leadership,77 which successfully ended the civil war. It 
ameliorated the lingering ideological divisions within the nation and the institutions of 
71 Innanchai, “The Roles of the Legislature and Civil Society in Civil-Military Relations,” 303.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Chandra D. Bhatta, “Civil Society in Nepal: In Search of Reality,” Nepalese Studies 34, no. 1 
(January 2007), 48. 
74 Ibid, 49. 
75 Hachhethu, “Civil Society and Political Participation,” 10. 
76 Shah ,Civil Society in Uncivil Places, 47.  
77 Chandra D. Bhatta, Contemporary Civil Society in Nepal (South-South Collaborative Program 
Occasional Paper series no.6) (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2008), 2. 
http://bvsde.org.ni/clacso/publicaciones/op06_Bhata.pdf. 
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state and government, and it rehabilitated Nepal’s political process in the eyes of the 
international community. This role opened the way for regional and international aid and 
assistance, all further bolstering Nepal’s democratic consolidation. 
Still, the political inclination of Nepal’s civil society and its focus on issues of 
political movement are the main concerns for many authors. Krishna Hachhethu claims 
that “in the early period of democracy, Nepali society was highly politicized in party 
lines.”78 This partisan division carried into civil society in Hachhethu’s estimation. 
Moreover, in her research paper on the “Development of Civil Society in Nepal,” Astha 
Joshi agrees, noting, “Political institutions have tried to co-opt the civil society through 
mobilization and resistance for their own interests.”79 Similarly, the International Crisis 
Group Asia describes Nepal’s civil society as a “fractured” institution, which “has lost 
some of its unity and credibility”80 for its politicization. 
Nepal’s CMR has revolved around its internal political dynamics and instability, 
which has generated friction in relations, and requires positive contributions from all 
related actors. On the other hand, despite being a new phenomenon, Nepal’s civil society 
has demonstrated its capability to work for the betterment of the society. Although civil 
society’s independence and neutrality in terms of political affiliation is questioned, it is 
also taking shape during democratic consolidation, and the process of strengthening CMR 
will also strengthen its capability as well. This thesis will endeavor to contribute to the 
study of civil-military relations during the democratic consolidation of Nepal as a 
developing country by combining the role of its civil society in strengthening CMR. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Amid its political instability and long transitional period, Nepal lacked effective 
civilian control. Currently Nepal is being governed by an interim constitution while the 
present constitutional assembly—the second since 2006—endeavors to draft a new 
78 Hachhethu, “Civil Society and Political Participation,” 3. 
79 Astha Joshi, “Nepal’s Civil Society and its Development,” (master’s thesis, Asian University for 
Women, Chittagong, Bangladesh, 2009), 2.   
80 International Crisis Group, “Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands?” 37. 
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constitution. It will also determine the security policy and the new role of the military. In 
these circumstances, political leaders of different parties are struggling to establish their 
own agendas. The military, as a security organ, can give suggestions but cannot voice its 
requirements or concerns to the government in this process. In the process of policy 
formation, civil society could play a positive role to ensure that the government adopts a 
proper mechanism of control or that the existing control and oversight mechanisms 
perform effectively.  
Considering the current situations of Nepal, three hypotheses can be formulated: 
1. Civil society has played a positive role in establishing democratic civilian 
control during each of Nepal’s political transitions since 1950, and it could play an 
effective role to ensure strong civil-military relations during democratic consolidation in 
Nepal.  
2. Because political influence is deeply rooted, it is difficult to isolate groups 
within civil society in Nepal from their political affiliations. Thus, civil society’s active 
role in military affairs could be more harmful than beneficial.  
3. Although the majority of civil society in Nepal is politically motivated, 
substantial numbers of neutral institutions are also present. Hence, a balanced and 
selective approach while using civil society in establishing democratic civilian control 
makes a positive impact. 
As Yanyong Innanchai asserts, “Many factors contribute to the success and failure 
of the democratic control of armed forces.”81 Actually, society is closely involved in the 
control mechanism because it establishes ruling authorities over the military by electing 
its representatives. Moreover, Linz and Stepan claim that “among several actors, civil 
society is the one that monitors the government’s actions.”82 Thus, Nepal should look for 
the effective role of civil society even if its civil society’s activities mostly focus on 
political development and are, in turn, politically influenced. 
81 Innanchai, “The Roles of the Legislature and Civil Society in Civil-Military Relations,” 9. 
82 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 9. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The scope of this study covers two fundamental aspects of Nepal: the state of 
CMR and the role of civil society. First, this paper analyzes CMR in Nepal, and identifies 
the reasons behind the unstable relations between civilian authorities and the military. 
Second, it explores the different phenomena in civil society including its evolution 
throughout different period of political change, and their role during each movement. 
While considering civil-society’s role, the study focuses on the involvement of civil 
society in the issues of security and military affairs only. It also analyzes the relations 
among the government, the military and society or the population in general. 
The research will be conducted as a single case study of Nepal and will mainly 
focus on political upheavals that occurred after the 1950s. The theoretical aspects of 
CMR and civil society will be analyzed mainly using secondary sources, though primary 
sources will be used to access the ongoing and developing events. Besides English-
language sources, the present research also analyzes the books, journals and articles 
published in the Nepali-language to incorporate more in-depth material. 
This paper will assess the present condition of civilian control in Nepal, explore 
the reasons behind the problems in CMR, and identify the contributions of civil society to 
enhance CMR during the democratic consolidation of Nepal.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis will consist of five chapters. Chapter II focuses on the state of CMR 
during various political transitions that occurred from 1950s to 2006, in Nepal. This 
chapter analyzes how frequent political change and continual establishment of a new 
government affected the mechanisms of civilian control. It also attempts to identify the 
reasons for erupting conflict in CMR, and efforts taken to enhance the civilian control 
during and after each political transition. This chapter also examines the gaps in CMR to 
identify the contributions of civil society.  
Chapter III focuses on the civil society of Nepal. It attempts to explore the 
historical overview of Nepal’s civil society, its development, and contributions during 
political transitions. Chapter IV analyzes civil society’s role in Nepal’s CMR during 
 18 
political transitions after the restoration of democracy in Nepal in 1990. Although, 
several civil society groups are present, this research focuses on the media, Nagarik 
Samaj, and human rights organizations because they are the leading civil society groups 
in Nepal. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings and includes recommendations.  
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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS OF NEPAL 
Protracted transition and the instability generated from fluid political 
circumstances have both shaped and complicated civil-military relations in Nepal. As 
Pramod K. Kantha argues, “Nepal’s attempt to craft and secure democracy has been 
unusually protracted since the country’s first experience of democracy in 1950.”83 
Frequent changes destroyed the continuity of old institutional mechanisms of civilian 
control. In this way, unsuccessful attempts at consolidating democracy increased the 
political instability, which also weakened civilian control. In the past, the king frequently 
disturbed the democratic government’s efforts. When Nepal became a republic, the 
conflicting political ideologies of the various parties created problems in CMR. After 
each change, the new government has either reformed or implemented existing 
mechanisms of control, though civilian control remains weak in Nepal.  
To understand the ups and downs in relations between the military and the 
governing authorities in Nepal, it is essential to explore how power transformation 
occurred during each political transition. This chapter focuses on identifying how the 
changing political ideology of the governing authorities affected civilian control and 
produced friction in CMR. It further analyzes the steps taken by the democratically 
elected government of Nepal to balance the king’s constitutional authority until he 
became a constitutional monarch. Finally, it also explores the ongoing nature of the 
problems in CMR.  
A. HISTORY OF NEPAL’S POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRANSITIONS 
Political transitions since 1950 have had a significant impact on a Nepal’s 
political history. Within a period of six decades, the country witnessed frequent political 
transitions, which paved the way for Nepal’s transformation from the Royal Kingdom 
into a republic. During these years, Nepal’s democratic consolidation revolved around the 
83  Pramod K. Kantha, “Nepal’s Protracted Democratization in Terms of Modes of Transition,” 
Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 28, no.1, (2010): 59. 
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol28/iss1/5. 
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king and the political leadership. Although they fought together to establish democracy, 
later they became rivals. In 1950, the king not only supported the people’s movement for 
democracy, but also risked his dynasty84 in fighting for it. However, after a series of 
upheavals in the political system, the peoples’ movement in 2006 dethroned the king and 
abolished the 243-year-old Shah Dynasty.  
After introducing democracy in 1951, Nepal adopted different types of 
government: the direct rule of a monarch from 1960 to 1990 and again between 2005 and 
2006; a multi-party democratic system with a constitutional monarch between 1990 and 
2002, and a multi-party democratic system as a republic after 2008.85 Such political 
practices deeply affected Nepal’s CMR because the army encountered frequently 
changing governing authorities practicing different control mechanisms after each 
succession such as changing laws, forming a parliamentary committee, creating a 
National Security Council (NSC).  
However, the way political transitions occurred and the way governing authorities 
nurtured the Nepal Army during their rule became problematic for the military because 
every transition to a different political system also brought changes in military policy. It 
has been problematic for the NA because the governing authority and political leadership 
changed such policies in accordance with their political ideologies. Because there was 
insufficient time to institutionalize existing mechanisms of democratic civilian control, 
such activities could not enhance CMR.  
1. Political Development After Democratic Restoration in 1950 
The political change of 1950 is considered Nepal’s rise to democracy because 
prior to that, Nepal had been ruled by the Rana oligarchy for more than 100 years.86 The 
84 In support of democratic movement, King Tribhuwan along with his family took asylum on Indian 
embassy and later flew to India endangering his throne, which became a turning point in establishing 
democracy in Nepal. See Leo E. Rose and John T Scholz, Nepal: Profile of a Himalayan Kingdom 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).  
85 The interim constitution of 2006 has suspended the king’s power by giving executive authority to 
prime minister. Later on 2008, the constitutional assembly declared Nepal as a republic state.  
86 Shiva K. Dhungana, “Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal: A Critical Reflection,” 
Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 3, no. 2, (2007), 71. 
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establishment of democracy has had profound effects on CMR because it ended the Rana 
regime’s control over the military, began a new era of democratization, and provided an 
opportunity to establish the democratic civilian control along with consolidation. Before 
1950, as Kumar claims, the NA was “under the thumb of four commanding generals who 
were directly responsible to the supreme commander—the Rana Prime Minister.”87 
However, revolution has changed this equation. With this change, not only the civilian 
leadership but also the NA got the opportunity to strengthen and institutionalize CMR by 
reforming the military’s organization and adopting democratic mechanisms. 
Due to the prevailing political situation, the transformation of military control 
from the Rana regime to democratic institutions did not occur completely. The political 
leadership of that period could not consolidate democracy and establish strong 
institutions to ensure civilian control, which facilitated the king’s emergence as an 
influential authority in the country within a decade. Because of the fragile political 
situation and lack of effective control from political leadership, the loyalty of the military 
shifted back to the king. In 1952, King Tribhuwan assumed the title of Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief.88 The conflict between major political parties and competition 
among the leadership increased political instability, which also provided room for the 
King to play a political game. Instead of focusing on reforming the democratic 
institutions including the military, Surendra Rawal states, “the political parties competed 
with one another … and created their own police forces to protect their leaders and to 
manage political rallies.”89 Rose and Scholz claim that despite substantial control in the 
political forum, party leaders “were too divisive, disorganized, and unrepresentative of 
the country as a whole to establish a stable, legitimate regime.”90 The volatile political 
situation helped the king emerge as the prominent figure for stability.  
87 Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” 139. 
88 Ibid, 140. 
89 Surendra Singh Rawal, “United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations in 
Troop Contributing Countries” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010): 18. 
90 Rose and Scholz, Nepal, 46. 
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The lack of stability and unhealthy party politics increased difficulties for the 
democratic government, which also undermined its capabilities. The political situation 
became more unstable when, according to Rose and Scholz, “one regional party leader’s 
attempted coup … almost succeeded in overthrowing the first Nepali Congress cabinet by 
using the … police force.”91 This move not only created a problem for the Congress 
party but also alerted the king to the plot. After being sworn in, King Mahindra took a 
keen interest in military affairs in 1955 and organized the military in isolation from 
civilian bureaucracy. By organizing the military under his direct control, Rose and Scholz 
argue, “[he] kept active military officers strictly out of politics. Thus, the army remained 
an important but isolated institution … and strongly supportive of the monarchy.”92 
Moreover, the king made sure it became a law that the military came under direct control. 
One provision of the Military Act of 1959 made the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) 
more “responsible and accountable to his majesty.”93 Besides assuming military control, 
the king also sought an active political role, and the behavior and that of political leaders 
provided him this opportunity.  
2. The King’s Seizure of Executive Power in 1960 
The king’s use of the military in 1960 to overthrow the democratic authority 
severely affected CMR. After witnessing six different cabinets in his first six years, King 
Mahindra assumed executive authority and imposed direct rule in 1960, jailing most 
party activists including the prime minister.94 The NA supported the king when he 
assumed executive power, curbed the democratic government, and introduced the party-
less Panchayat95 as a new political system. King Mahendra’s step, known as a royal 
91Rose and Scholz, Nepal, 42. 
92 Ibid, 57. 
93 Pathak, “Civil-Military Relations: Nepalese Context,” 63.  
94 Rose and Scholz, Nepal, 47. 
95 Panchayat was a party-less political system under an absolute monarchy. It was also known as a 
guided democracy because people could elect their representatives, but candidates are not associated with 
any political parties. The elected members form a parliament and members of the parliament will chose 
prime minister, which is responsible to his majesty the king. See Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, 
Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966).  
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coup, not only ended the decade-long democratic practice, but also called into question 
the NA’s obedience to democracy. As a consequence, the NA lost the trust of political 
leadership. Political leaders regarded the NA, as Nihar Nayak claims, “as the king’s 
Army rather than an Army for the protection of the common people.”96 This perception 
of the political leaders has widened the gap with the military and ultimately weakened 
CMR.  
This incident, followed by the promulgation of a new constitution in 1962 further 
deepened the problem. The new constitution gave enormous power to the king, making 
him the head of state and the supreme commander of the military with the powers “to 
raise and maintain armed forces; to grant commissions in such forces; to appoint 
Commanders-in-Chief and to determine their powers, duties and remunerations.”97 In 
addition, the constitution further centralized the military’s control, because it made the 
king’s prior approval a mandatory provision to file any bill in House of Parliament 
related to military affairs.98 In this way, the military remained under the direct control of 
the king, and the civilian authority had no role to play in military affairs. Decades of 
democracy ended with the unsuccessful attempt at democratic consolidation and 
democratization of the military. It further alienated the military from the civilian 
leadership. With the end of this attempt at democratic consolidation, the military fell 
outside civilian control. 
3. Democratic Restoration of 1990 
The restoration of a multi-party democratic system in the aftermath of the 
people’s movement in 1990 changed the nexus between the king and the political parties. 
The king’s authority was restricted as a constitutional monarch. The creation of the NSC 
as a democratic mechanism for military control was a significant achievement for the 
new government. Although the democratic government implemented mechanisms to 
establish civilian control, the political leadership could not rule out the influence of the 
96 Nayak, “Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” 98. 
97 Joshi and Rose, Democratic Innovations in Nepal, 291. 
98 Ibid. 
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king in the national political system and made a power deal. Deepak Thapa and Bandita 
Sijapati claim, “The issue of control over the army was resolved by providing the king 
with the authority to mobilize … [it], but on the recommendation of a Security Council 
… which, theoretically gave the civilian government the upper hand.”99 The king also 
remained the supreme commander of the military.  
However, the 1990 constitution did not solve the anticipated problems of CMR; 
rather, it created confusion over the military’s control and oversight. It neither fully 
established civilian control nor succeeded in separating the military from the palace. The 
king succeeded in retaining the prerogative of approving the government’s 
recommendation for military mobilization. Professor Dhruba Kumar explains the 
problem: 
Although Article 118 of the 1990 Constitution asserted civilian supremacy 
over the armed forces through the organization of a National Defense 
Council (NDC), it was unclear how this would function since the same 
Constitution made the King the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
Royal Nepal Army with the final authority to ‘operate and use’ the army 
on the recommendation of the NDC.100 
This provision established the ambiguous condition of dual authority of the king and the 
government over the military, which also paved the way for future conflict. Thapa and 
Sharma claim that the military and the political leadership did not trust each other during 
political transitions.101 Constitutional provisions also helped the king remain close to the 
military and maintain his traditional authority over it. It also kept the military in isolation 
from civil society. As a result, the NA did not receive an opportunity to enhance relation 
with civilian authorities; the military remained unknown to the majority of the country’s 
political leadership, which resulted in weak civilian control.  
99 Deepak Thapa and Bandita Sijapati, A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003), 35. 
100 Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” 141. 
101 Thapa and Sharma, “Democracy Building and Changing Role of the Nepal Military,” 969. 
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4. Maoist Insurgency 
The beginning of the Maoist insurgency in 1997 and the government’s decision to 
use military means to counter the armed conflict caused an intense political confrontation 
over civilian control. This proposal to use military means became a controversial issue. 
Krishna Hachhethu claims that “the question of military mobilization has brought about 
conflict and contradictions between the elected government on the one hand and the 
palace and the army on the other.”102 The king had rejected the prime minister’s proposal 
to mobilize the military, but political leaders interpreted this as the NA’s denial of 
democratic order. As most of the mainstream political parties were already suspicious of 
the NA’s loyalty, the king’s obstruction of the plan only augmented their belief.  
This controversy not only created friction in CMR but also forced the government 
to use more coercive measures to balance the military. In 1960, the king had dismissed 
the congress party’s government so the Congress party also perceived it as a planned 
action of the king and the military. The government created a new armed entity, the 
Armed Police Force (APF), as a countervailing power to balance the military and to fight 
with the Maoist insurgents.103 However, the creation of the APF did not improve the 
government’s relations with the military because APF remained under the Home 
Ministry, which rather increased service rivalry between the military and APF.  
The armed Maoist rebellion destabilized internal security, which further 
weakened civilian control. This was to be expected because, as Desch claims, “a state 
facing low external and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian 
control of the military.”104 At this juncture, Nepal also experienced unstable CMR 
because the conflict between the king and the government over military’s mobilization 
resulted in the resignation of the prime minister. This incident worsened the state of CMR 
because, while resigning from the post, then-Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala 
102 Krishna Hachhethu, “The Nepali State and the Maoist Insurgency, 1996–2001,” in Himalayan 
People’s War, ed. Michael Hutt (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 71.  
103 Ibid, 68.  
104 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 14.  
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couched his resignation as a protest of the military’s insubordination. He also blamed the 
NA for not obeying the civilian leadership’s orders, which brought the issue of civilian 
control to the political limelight.105  
This situation emerged because of differing perceptions of the Maoist problem. 
The Congress Party’s government viewed the Maoist conflict as an insurgency problem 
and decided to use the armed forces. In contrast, the king had viewed it as a political 
problem and wanted to solve it by using political means. Because the constitution of 1990 
had given him the authority to make final decisions in military affairs, the king denied the 
government’s recommendation.106 Although, the king had used his constitutional 
authority to reject the military’s mobilization, it proved counterproductive and weakened 
the control of the democratic institutions over the military. Though the government 
mobilized the military in the counterinsurgency at a later stage, it already had created a 
problem. As an outcome, the friction in CMR further increased the gap between the 
military and the civilian authority, and once again the democratic control of the military 
became one of the major issues in the political agenda of Nepal. It also favored the 
military’s support to the king in subsequent years, even when he took steps against the 
democratic system. 
5. The King’s Takeover in 2005 and the Democratic Transition of 2006 
The government’s struggle to consolidate democratic institutions and establish 
effective civilian control continued because once again the king stepped into politics and 
assumed the state’s executive authority. On February 1, 2005, the king dismissed the 
then-Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and took personal control of state power.107  
105 Although the unsuccessful attempt to implement the government’s decision of mobilizing the 
military was a main reason for the prime minister’s resignation, the NA did not play a role of kingmaker 
here. Rather, the king denied military mobilization. It is argued that the king wanted to solve the Maoists’ 
problem through the political process and generate the dialogue, but democratic parties were trying to crush 
the communist extremists through military means. Thus, it was a clash between the king and the prime 
minister; the military just became an issue.  
106 Article 118 (2) states: “His majesty shall operate and use the Royal Nepal Army on the 
recommendation of the National Defense Council.” See “Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 2047 BS 
(1990),” 57.  
107 “Rights-Nepal: Kings Takeover May Put Monarchy Itself in Danger,” Global Information 
Network, February 2, 2005, http://search.proquest.com/docview/457580198?accountid=12702. 
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This incident was significant from the CMR perspective because the military remained on 
the side of the king and obeyed his orders. 
The political transition of 2006 had a great impact on Nepal’s political system. It 
brought three major changes: abolishing the Shah Dynasty, peacefully transforming the 
decade long Maoist insurgency, and restoring the multi-party democracy. The changed 
political system also had great implications on CMR because the NA had lost its 
traditional supreme commander who had remained since its formation: the king, replaced 
by the president. Until then, as Chalmers claims, “as an institution the army had enjoyed 
a relatively comfortable existence,”108 but the new democratic government implemented 
various mechanisms to institutionalize civilian control. According to Kumar, “the 
Military Act 2007 … endorsed the constitutional mandate of the Government of Nepal to 
control, use and mobilize the Nepali Army on the recommendation of the National 
Security Council.”109  
As an immediate step in bringing democratic scrutiny over the military, the 
interim constitution also modified the provisions and removed the Chief of the Army 
Staff as a member of the NSC.110 As Kumar claims, “unlike the 1990 Constitution, with 
the monarchy abolished and the COAS’s membership removed by the Interim 
Constitution 2007, the NSC is now monopolized by politicians and is the highest security 
policy-making body.”111 Such provisions created a favorable situation for installing 
civilian control over the military, but political situations did not allow effective use of 
these means, and CMR remains problematic. 
The emergence of the UCPM as the largest political party in the first Constitution 
Assembly further worsened the CMR. It was the time to reform the military, but Maoist 
leaders had a different plan based on their political ideology. Despite heading the 
coalition government and also holding the Defense portfolio, according to Rawal, “the 
Maoists talked openly about [the] launching of an October Revolution, establishing a 
108 Chalmers, “State Power and the Security Sector,” 60.  




                                                 
Peoples’ Republic in Nepal, and integrating all the Maoist Combatants into the NA.”112 
The Maoist quest of influencing the military according to its party policy created friction 
between the government and the military.  
The problem turned into a tussle when the Maoist party’s General Secretary Ram 
Bahadur Thapa became the Minister of Defense. He “refused to endorse the routine 
extension of the tenure of eight Brigadier Generals as recommended by Army 
Headquarter. Shortly thereafter, the NA’s sports team walked out of a national sports 
event protesting the late entry given to the Maoist … combatants.”113 It increased the 
tension between the government and the military, and finally the government decided to 
sack the COAS. The President overruled the decision, but the prime minister resigned. 
The collapse of the democratically elected government because of the military further 
weakened civilian control in Nepal.    
The major problem in Nepal’s CMR under civilian authority lies in the attitudes 
of civilians who perceive the military as untrustworthy. Thus, the military never became 
a priority for the new regime, and political leaders neglected the armed forces. After the 
political system changed from a kingdom to a Federal Democratic Republic Nepal 
(FDRN) in 2008, political leaders neither began the process of democratization of the 
military nor replaced traditional Army-Monarch relationship with democratic means. The 
army was left under MOD without expanding its capability to meet additional challenges 
in a new political environment. In this way, the prevailing political situation not only 
derailed the democratic consolidation, but also shaped the unstable CMR with weak 
civilian control.  
B. NEPAL’S CMR AMID THE TRANSITIONS 
In addition to continual political upheaval, the Maoists waged armed conflict that 
turned into a decade long civil war added immense friction in CMR. Two things 
contributed to this friction. First, when the violent conflict was in full swing, the king did 
112 Rawal, “United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations,” 37. 
113 Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS), Discourses of Civil-Military Relations in Nepal, Policy 
Paper 7, (February 2012), 13. http://acsc-shivapuri.mil.np/pdf/L59__Civil-
Military_relations_in_Nepal19_March_2012.pdf. 
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not approve the government’s decisions to mobilize the military against the Maoist 
insurgency. Second, after the Maoists joined the political mainstream, the government 
decided to integrate the Maoist combatants into the military. These decisions ultimately 
weakened the military’s relations with civilian authorities. Moreover, ruled by the interim 
constitution since the last political change in 2006, the government has yet to determine 
the NA’s future role in the new democratic environment. Political leaders believe that in 
the absence of the king the military is automatically under the civilian control, and they 
are more focused on a political agenda rather than strengthening civilian control. Political 
instability has delayed the democratization of the military, which ultimately has 
weakened CMR.   
1. The Army in Nepal 
It is well worth emphasizing here that the NA has neither intervened in 
governmental affairs nor involved itself in a military coup even amid the fluid political 
situations and instability; rather the NA has shown remarkable professionalism, and 
obeyed the governing authorities. In support of this argument Nihar Nayak claims, “The 
Nepal Army is not known to have tried to take advantage of the fragile political situation 
in the country for its own aggrandisement, unlike the armies of some other South Asian 
countries, such as, Pakistan and Bangladesh.”114 The military has accepted every political 
transition and adopted the new political environment. Kul Chandra Gautam notes:  
It has been a mark of Nepal Army’s professionalism and sensitivity to the 
winds of political change that, although accused of being “royalist,” it did 
not attempt to intervene in Nepal’s dramatic political transition in the past 
4 years, that led to the abolition of monarchy and coming to power, 
through elections, of CPN-Maoist against which it had previously fought a 
bitter war. It is worth noting that in similar circumstances, elsewhere in the 
world, it is not uncommon to see a restless military staging mutiny, 
bloodshed and acrimony, if not outright coups d’état.115 
114 Nayak, “Nepal Army at the Crossroads,” 97. 
115 Kul Chandra Gautam, “Enhancing Democratic Control of Nepal Army as Part of Nepal’s Security 
Sector Reform,” accessed on January 20, 2015, http://www.kulgautam.org/2010/01/enhancing-democratic-
control-of-nepal-army-as-part-of-nepals-security-sector-reform/. 
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In other words, despite receiving blame for taking sides and supporting the king on many 
occasions, as Gautam appreciates, the obedience of the NA to its civilian masters should 
enhance its relationship to civilian authorities.   
The NA has shown its commitment to the changed democratic scenario of the 
contemporary age, as well. As Bishnu Raj Upreti and Peter Vanhoutte argue, “contrary to 
the assumptions of some analysts that the Nepalese Army would openly stand for the 
king, it instead cooperated with the government, expressed its commitment to peace and 
started to respond positively to public expectations that the army should fully support the 
new democratic developments.”116 In addition, the NA also accepted the most 
controversial political decision of integrating Maoist combatants in the military. As 
Gautam argues, the NA’s “image calls for a genuine effort to transform both the 
perception and reality of its credentials as a force that is truly under democratic control 
and honors civilian supremacy.”117  
Integrating Maoist combatants was a major hurdle for the peace process, and by 
accepting such a decision the military has showed its willingness to work under the 
democratic leadership.118 These arguments indicate that the NA played a positive and 
supportive role on its part and proved its obedience toward the legitimate governing 
authorities. However, despite the NA’s loyalty and obedience, CMR remains unstable 
and weak. Rather, civilian authorities remained suspicious and blamed the military for 
taking sides during political movements, which made the CMR more critical in Nepal. 
Thus, every political change has significant implications for CMR in Nepal. 
2. Reasons Behind the Problems in CMR 
The lack of effective civilian control hindered democratic consolidation in Nepal. 
As Richard H. Kohn claims, “A country may have civilian control of the military without 
116 Bishnu Raj Upreti and Peter Vanhoutte, “Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” accessed on January 20, 2015, http://eprpinformation.org/files/peaceprocesses/ssr/ssr-in-
nepal-challenges-and-opportunities.pdf.  
117 Gautam, “Enhancing Democratic Control of Nepal Army.” 
118 Krishna Pokharel, “World News: In Nepal, the Next Step is to Merge Army, Rebels,” Wall Street 
Journal, Eastern edition, October 27, 2008, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/399094159?accountid=12702.  
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democracy, [but] it cannot have democracy without civilian control.”119 The continuation 
of conflicts among the political leadership, frequent interruption by the king, and a 
decade-long Maoist insurgency increased political instability, and also protracted 
democratic consolidation in Nepal. An incomplete transition created favorable grounds 
for another political movement that led to a series of political changes, and frequent 
changes did not allow sufficient time to strengthen existing democratic institutional 
mechanisms of control. Such circumstances finally resulted in weak civilian control over 
security forces and unstable CMR.  
a. Political Instability  
Political instability was the main factor in creating friction in CMR and 
weakening civilian control in Nepal. The political system lacked stability because of the 
inter-party competition and intra-party conflict among different political parties. The 
“frequent changes in the government posed major challenges to the process of democratic 
consolidation,”120 and the government could not establish cooperative relations among 
the different political parties. Between 1990 and 2006, the government changed 13 times 
and after 2006 to 2014, eight prime-ministers served in succession.121 The country is 
being ruled by an interim constitution, and because of this the government is unable to 
implement a long-term plan. The outcome of such a condition is friction in CMR and 
weak civilian control because, as Michel H. Desch claims, “changes in the civilian 
institutions of government affect civilian control of the military.”122 Therefore, the 
political instability is one of the major reasons for a weak and unstable CMR in Nepal.  
b. Weak Institutions  
Weak institutionalization and a lack of the effective scrutiny over the military 
during consolidation is another reason behind fragile civilian control. It was essential 
119 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 141.  
120 Ramjee P. Parajuli, The Democratic Transition in Nepal (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2000), 286. 
121 “BBC timeline,” Last modified August 14, 2014, accessed on December 22, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12499391. 
122 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 11. 
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because, as Derek Lutterbek claims, “the more institutionalized the security establishment 
is, the more willing it will be [to] disengage from the power and allow political 
reform.”123 However, the newly established government after each successive transition 
did not consider strengthening democratic institutions capable of ensuring that the NA 
remains within a given jurisdiction. Abandoning old institutions was common in existing 
political culture as the country had not institutionalized the democracy, because as Kumar 
argues, “making new institutional arrangements that would lead to adequate civil-military 
relations was never a priority.”124 The government neither enhanced the capability of the 
ministry of defense nor used parliamentary committees or the NSC effectively.  
These circumstances resulted in the military’s involvement in political activities, 
which affected CMR. For example, while the interim government was articulating the 
constitution after the political transition of 1990, a group of the military generals visited 
the prime minister and a committee and put pressure to continue with the king as the 
supreme commander of the NA.125 In another incident when the country was engaged in 
a Maoist insurgency and the democratic government decided to mobilize the military 
against the Maoist insurgency, the NA showed reluctance rather, as Prashant Jha claims, 
“made it clear that a declaration of state of emergency was a precondition to its 
mobilization.”126 Thus, Nepal’s unsuccessful efforts to institutionalize democratic control 
mechanisms obstructed the establishment of effective civilian control. 
Democratic institutions have established civilian authorities over the military to 
ensure democratic control, but Nepal’s parliament and the ministry of defense could not 
perform their roles effectively. Theoretically, channeling all military affairs, according to 
Bruneau and Goetze, “a MOD fills as [a] buffer between politics and the armed 
forces,”127 and coordinates all military matters with related actors, which did not happen 
in Nepal. Because Nepal’s MOD was not modernized to cope with additional 
123 Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprising,” 31. 
124 Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” 140. 
125 Pathak, “Civil-Military Relations: Nepalese Context,” 64. 
126 Prashant Jha, Battles of the New Republic: A Contemporary History of Nepal (New Delhi: Aleph 
Book Company, 2014), 45. 
127 Bruneau and Goetze, “Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control,” 78. 
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requirements in a changed scenario, it neither functioned as a focal point for military 
affairs nor prevented a direct approach by the military to the King. Due to such a 
condition, the military remained close and loyal to the king rather than civilian 
authorities, which ultimately weakened the civilian control. 
Moreover, the government of Nepal has also formed a parliamentary committee 
and the NSC to strength civilian control. According to Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, the 
legislature can play an important role “in controlling the military, formulating defense 
legislation, policy and the budgets; and monitoring their implementations.”128 The 
system of transparency makes the military leaders more responsible and accountable for 
their actions because they have to justify the people’s representatives: the legislature. 
Once the military is made accountable for their actions and responsible to democratic 
institutions, civilian control will be enhanced. In addition to parliament, as Bruneau, 
Matei and Sakoda claim, NSC “can be a core element for democratic CMR in that it 
enhances civilian control and effective implementation of roles and missions.”129 They 
further describe its seven roles:  
a) Inform and advise the chief executive on events and policies in the 
areas of national security and defense; b) To coordinate among the 
players, establish consensus and see the policy through to implementation; 
c) Facilitate communications with the legislative branch on security 
policies coming from the executive; d) To see that the intelligence product 
is made available to what are mainly civilian decision-makers within the 
executive, in a form that is useful to them; e) To develop the documents 
such as decision memoranda or national security strategy. f) To ensure 
some level of co-operation and implementation of a policy; g) To handle 
foreign relations beyond the generally diplomatic and formal level.130  
These roles specify that the NSC has a great power to maintain balance between 
the legislative and executive branch. Furthermore, its effective actions facilitate in 
formulating and implementing appropriate policies, which ultimately establishes 
128 Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global Comparisons,” 35.  
129 Thomas C. Bruneau, Cristiana C. Florina Matei, and Sak Sakoda, “National Security Councils: 
Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil - Military Relations,” Defense and Security Analysis 25, no. 
3 (September 2009), 255.  
130 Ibid, 257–58. 
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democratic civilian control by ensuring military performs its duty within given 
jurisdiction.  
However, this transition did not occur in Nepal. The shortcomings of the 1990 
constitution restricted the effective role of the parliamentary committee, and the NSC 
also remained behind the shadow of the government. Kumar claims that the “constitution 
denied the parliament’s role in military affairs and missed the chance to confer power to 
the people’s representatives to control state security agencies. This lapse hindered the 
evolution of a democratic tradition in the sphere of civil-military relations.”131 Such 
conditions not only undermined the effectiveness of the parliament, but also hindered the 
parliament from checking the misuse of authority by the executive. The democratic 
institutions were supposed to be strong and effective because, as Desch claims, “weak 
state institutions are less effective tools of civilian control.”132 Thus, partially due to the 
lack of political leadership’s interest, and partially because they lacked consensus about 
new provisions, Nepal’s democratic institutions remained weak and could not strengthen 
civilian control. The unsuccessful attempt at writing the new constitution since 2006 also 
illustrates the critical condition of political system in Nepal. Such a condition shaped 
incomplete consolidation and weak civilian control.  
c. Incomplete Transition 
An incomplete transformation of power and authority from the king to a 
democratic government during political transitions provide an opportunity for the king to 
reemerge on the political scene. Such conditions allowed the king to intervene in the 
governing system, which also weakened civilian control.  
The prerogative of the monarchy has continued since the restoration of a multi-
party democracy in 1990. Despite being restricted as a constitutional monarch, the king’s 
legal status has not changed much. Michael Hunt describes the situation: “A compromise 
was reached on the matter of control of the army. The king is to remain the title of 
supreme commander- in chief.... and National Security Council headed by PM will take 
131 Kumar, “Democratic Control of Security Forces,” 142. 
132 Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 9. 
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charge of all military operations.”133 In an ideal situation, the government should have 
the authority to make independent decisions in the consolidated democratic environment. 
On the other hand, if reform is not completed, the military might “retain such 
prerogatives that the democratically elected government is not even de jure 
sovereign,”134 and government might have to share power or accept restriction from non-
democratic actors. The same thing happened in Nepal. Although the authority was 
transferred, a constitutional provision allowed the king to retain his position over the 
military, and the military continued its traditional loyalty.135 
The circumstances did not improve even after the abolishment of the Shah 
Dynasty. Although there was no need to share power with the remnants of an autocratic 
regime in the absence of the king, the power hungry political leaders and contradictory 
ideologies of different parties resulted in an incomplete transition to democracy. 
According to Bala Nanda Sharma, after the political system changed from a kingdom to a 
republic in 2008, “traditional relations of the Army with the monarch have to [be] 
replace[d] with the new relationship with the elected and legitimate people’s 
representative,”136 but it did not occur. Ultimately, a lack of consolidation resulted in a 
lack of effective democratic control mechanisms. 
d. Ignoring the Military After Transition 
The attitude of most of the political leadership toward military affairs also has 
created a problem in establishing effective democratic civilian control. By ignoring the 
democratization of the military, the leaders either tried to interfere in military norms 
according to their political ideologies or isolated and ignored the military. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the former Prime Minister of Nepal Bishweshowar Prasad Koirala, 
who was sacked and imprisoned by the king in 1960, has admitted that political 
133 Michael Hunt, “Drafting the 1990 Constitutions” in Nepal in Nineties: Versions of the Past, 
Visions of the Future (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 46. 
134 Linz and Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 4.  
135 Parajuli, Democratic Transition in Nepal, 294.   




                                                 
leadership did blunder by not democratizing, but rather ignoring the military. Surendra 
Rawal also claims, “During the democratic period, 1990–2005, political parties’ activities 
contributed to isolate the national army rather than making it a strong and credible 
institution of democracy and national security.”137 Ultimately, such behavior of the 
political leadership weakened civilian control.   
Surprisingly, with the absence of the king from the political scenario, relations 
have not fostered harmony: rather, friction in CMR has increased. The political leaders 
started considering the military affairs as a political agenda in national level politics. 
Their effort was to politicize the armed forces to ensure subordination under the regime, 
which was opposite to Feaver’s professionalization of the armed forces. According to 
Feaver, “maximizing professionalism is best achieved by getting the military out of 
politics,”138 but was not applied in Nepal. The leaders tried to control the military by 
influencing them through political ideology or coercive measures, not by 
professionalizing them. Rather, as claimed by Pathak, “[the government] could not 
democratize the Nepal Army, but stopped further recruitment and tried to restrict the 
RNA, encouraging the Nepal Police by allocating more resources to them.”139 In this 
way, the democratization of the military did not occur, which ultimately affected CMR. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The circumstances of a protracted democratic consolidation and weak civilian 
control created friction in Nepal’s CMR. Nepal’s pursuit of democratic consolidation and 
civilian control moves around the activities of the king and the political leadership. Until 
the king’s existence in power in different forms, he disrupted the process by stepping into 
a political system and curbing the democratic practice with the military’s assistance. In 
the past, political leaders used to criticize and blame the nexus between the king and the 
military for creating problems and weakening civilian control. However, even after the 
king’s departure from the political scene, CMR remains unstable and civilian control is 
137 Rawal, “United Nations Peacekeeping Participation and Civil-Military Relations,” 33. 
138 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 228.  
139 Pathak, “Civil-Military Relations: Nepalese Context,” 64. 
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still fragile. The government formed after each successive transition has implemented 
various mechanisms of democratic control, but problems still exist. The political leaders 
claim that they have sincerely played their roles, but the conflicting ideologies of each 
party have increased instability, and obstructed the effective implementation of 
mechanisms of democratic civilian control.  
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III. CIVIL SOCIETY DURING NEPAL’S POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS 
The development of civil society and political transitions in Nepal has a close 
relationship; civil society has contributed significantly during political movements to 
establish democracy in the country. In return, democratic circumstances have created a 
favorable environment for the development of civil society. Today, Nepal still struggles 
to consolidate its democracy, which will eventually enhance democratic CMR. Of several 
actors capable of influencing the states’ governing authorities and political parties, civil 
society could be the most viable option to boost consolidation: it can oversee the 
government’s activities, represent and inform the general public; assist the government 
and political leadership in this process.  
Because Nepal encompasses a wide range of civil society groups, each working in 
different fields in different capacities, it would be difficult to mention the contributions 
from all civil society groups. In Nepal, three civil society groups—the media, Nagarik 
Samaj,140 and human rights organizations—are considered influential and prominent.141 
Severally and together, these groups within civil society can exercise the most influence 
on democratic consolidation in Nepal. But have they?  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN NEPAL  
In ancient times, civil society in Nepal consisted of religious and societal 
activities. Dev Raj Dahal describes civil society’s evolution in Nepal: “Historians trace 
its genealogy with the birth of civility, public spiritedness, community building and 
norm-governed associational life which liberated the Nepalese citizens from the state of 
nature.”142 The adoption of moral values in society and the implementation of rules and 
140 Nagarik Samaj is the leading civil society group in Nepal. See Chapter I for explanation.  
141 Because the scope of this paper focuses on civil society’s role in strengthening CMR, this paper 
excludes religious organizations and corporate groups because these groups have not played a significant 
role in strengthening CMR. In addition, trade unions in Nepal function as sister organizations of 
mainstream political parties and advocate political ideologies of parental organizations, so this paper 
excludes such organizations from this analysis as well. 
142 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 21. 
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laws of governance were inherited from religious practices. These practices have a close 
link with Hindu and Buddhist religions that were the main source of two different types 
of civil society: one to work in politics and another in cultural matters.143 During ancient 
times, people created and maintained committees to celebrate festivals and perform social 
activities. Such requirements facilitated the creation of various types of civil society 
groups, which Dahal describes: “Civil society in Nepal is so variegated and disparate in 
terms of size, nature, function, character and identity that it is difficult to develop a 
precise definition.”144 The increasing democratic movement within the country also 
facilitated the development of civil society  
The political system of Nepal and its continual transition have significantly 
affected the development of civil society. Astha Joshi claims, “Each regime change had 
an effect on how civil society developed in Nepal for that particular time period.”145 
According to Joshi, the Rana regime tried to suppress the emergence of civil society by 
restricting educated people from forming groups. Furthermore, during the Panchayat 
period, “Government tried to control each and every aspect of the political, social, and 
economic life for stronger social control.”146 Therefore, different political parties created 
wings to mediate with the population, which also helped to revive civil society in that 
period.147  Thus, during the Panchayat period, as Dahal argues, “Civil society 
organizations emerged mostly as primordial identities … as an alternative and sometimes 
in opposition to patrimonial state[s].”148 In other words, the political affiliation of Nepal’s 
civil society originated in its historical development and continued until the restoration of 
democracy, which paved the way for its independent development. 
The downfall of the Panchayat system and the restoration of democracy in 1990 
sped up the development of civil society. The new democratic government reduced the 
143 Joshi, “Nepal’s Civil Society and its Development,” 16–17. 
144 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 21. 
145 Joshi, “Nepal’s Civil Society and its Development,” 39. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 33. 
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control of the activities of civil society groups, which encouraged the establishment, self-
organization, development and mobilization of such groups within the country.149 
Chandra D. Bhatta argues that the “modern concept of civil society in Nepal is fairly new 
despite the age-old existence of civic practices … which is more political than social in 
content.”150 Gerard Toffin also notes, “Since 1990, the country has seen an efflorescence 
of countless movements and organizations associated with social change at local, regional 
and national levels.”151  
The democratic environment favored the development of civil society groups, 
including the media. For example, except some weekly newspapers, state owned media 
had a monopoly during the previous political system. However, the establishment of 
Kantipur publications in 1993 paved the way for the development of private media, 
which expanded tremendously.152 The numbers of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) also increased substantially, and by 2011, a total of 34,000 NGOs have been 
registered with the Social Welfare Council (SWC), and approximately 720 organizations 
used to apply every month.153 In this way, with the growth of the democratic movement, 
different civil society groups increased and spread throughout the country.  
B. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
Civil society encompasses several aspects of society and incorporating an all-
inclusive definition is challenging. Cristoph Spurk claims that there is no commonly 
agreed definition of civil society because this concept is “diverse and can carry many 
meanings.”154 Furthermore, arguments of scholars vary on which groups should be 
included within the category of civil society. Spunk claims that civil society “‘can be all 
149 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 33. 
150 Bhatta, “Civil Society in Nepal: In Search of Reality,” 45. 
151 Toffin, “Crucible of Civil Society.” 
152 In Nepal, the first private daily newspaper in the Nepali language started in 1993, the first private 
FM station named Radio Kantipur aired on October 1998, and first private television station was started in 
2003.  
153 “50,000 NGOs in Nepal and Growing,” Kathmandu Insider, accessed on February 15, 2015. 
http://ktminsider.com/blog/2011/11/20/50000-ngos-in-nepal-and-growing/.  
154 Cristoph Spunk, “Understanding Civil Society,” in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical 
Assessment, ed. Thania Paffenholz (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010): 3.     
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things to the people.’”155 Larry J Diamond explains it as “an intermediary entity, standing 
between the private sphere and the state.”156 Hachhethu defines civil society in broader 
terms as “a secular forum that crosses religious, ethnic and political boundaries and its 
backbone comprises independent, conscious and educated people.”157 Moreover, Duncan 
Hiscock includes media in a civil society, which, he notes, “… in most societies plays a 
key role in sharing information and helping to form public attitudes.”158  
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, on the other hand, posit civil society as an “arena 
of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively 
autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests.”159 This chapter takes Linz and Stepan’s two 
major criteria, relative autonomy and self-organization as guidelines while focusing study 
on civil society and its contributions in Nepal.160   
As an essential part of democratic consolidation, civil society could perform 
several roles to support the government’s efforts of establishing democratic civil-military 
relations (CMR). However, Philippe C Schimitter claims that, “Civil society contributes 
to—but does not cause—the consolidation of democracy. It cannot unilaterally bring 
about democracy, or sustain democratic institutions and practices.”161 Therefore, civil 
society can assist in the new government’s effort to establish democratic civilian control 
of the armed forces because, according to Matei, “Contributions of external factors such 
155 Spunk, “Understanding Civil Society,” 3. 
156 Larry Jay Diamond, “Towards Democratic Consolidation” Journal of Democracy 5, no 3 (July 
1994): 5, DOI: 10.1353/jod.1994.0041. 
157 Hachhethu, “Civil Society and Political Participation,” 2. 
158 Duncan Hiscock, “The Role of Civil Society in Security Sector Governance in the South 
Caucasus,” in Security Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Visions: Regional 
Stability in Southern Caucasus Security Sector Reform (Wissenschaftliche Publikationen, 2004): 60. 
159 Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” 7. 
160 In addition, Karan Barbes and Peter Albrecht include religious groups and trade unions within the 
scope of civil society. According to them, “civil society is a domain parallel to, but separate from the state 
and the market, in which citizens freely group together according to their own interests. It encompasses a 
self- initiated and voluntary sector of formally associated individuals who pursue non-profit purposes in 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), commonly based organizations religious bodies, professional 
associations, trade unions, student groups, cultural societies, etc.” See Barbes and Albrecht, “Civil Society 
Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender.” 
161 Schmitter, Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy, 4. 
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as media, civil society … may be instrumental in achieving balance between control and 
effectiveness… [of the armed forces].”162 Moreover, Ian Leigh argues for eight methods 
by which civil society can contribute to the legislative process in shaping democratic 
CMR as follows: 
1) Carry out fact-finding studies; 2) Petition or brief members of 
parliament; 3) Organize lobbying campaigns; 4) Give oral or written 
evidence to parliamentary hearings or to committees; 5) Supply an expert 
adviser to a parliamentary committee; 6) Draft legislation or legislative 
amendments for members of parliament; 7) Criticize legislation and 
legislative amendments; 8) Draft alternative white papers on security 
policies.163 
These possible roles propagated by Ian Leigh covers broad areas and illustrates 
that civil society could contribute in regulating governing authorities. In addition, as 
Matei claims, because “democratic control implies transparency, openness, and 
accountability,”164 involvement of civil society as a watch dog further enhances 
democratic CMR. 
C. ROLE PLAYED BY CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS DURING POLITICAL 
TRANSITIONS  
However, to analyze civil society’s role in establishing democratic CMR during 
political transitions in Nepal, this chapter will use the roles of civil society presented in a 
framework by Matei: “informing the public; liaising government with the citizens; 
helping boost government legitimacy; exercising informal external oversight of the 
government; and providing a “learning” environment for elected officials and the 
public.”165 The roles presented by Matei in the context of “democratic reform of the 
intelligence” are significant and applicable in a Nepalese context because Nepal is trying 
to consolidate its democracy and also to reform its military. 
162 Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 74. 
163 Ian Leigh, “Executive, Legislative and Judicial Oversight and Guidance over the Security Sector,” 
in Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organization, eds. Eden Cole, 
Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach, UNDP, 2008, 38. 
164 Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 74. 
165 Ibid, 78. 
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Different civil society groups have played a significant role by supporting 
democratic movements, enhancing good governance, and in consolidating democracy 
from different capacities. These contributions will be analyzed by exploring the roles 
played by three selected groups of Nepal and relating these roles to framework for 
analysis. The media has emerged as an effective institution capable of scrutinizing and 
informing the people of the government’s activities. Nagarik Samaj has established itself 
as an influential organization by showing concerns for misconduct of the government 
authorities or private institutions and raising concern and assisting for good governance. 
This group also includes a wider range of volunteers from retired intellectuals, 
bureaucrats and experts of different services capable of influencing a broader population 
and the government. Similarly, human rights organizations monitor human rights 
violations and generate pressure at national and international levels. 
1. The Media 
By performing the role of watchdog and bringing states affairs under public 
scrutiny during different phases of political transition the media in Nepal—in addition to 
informing and educating the population—has also contributed significantly to democratic 
consolidation. Some of its significant roles are as follows: conducting public debates and 
talk shows; exercising informal oversight; and softening the issues and creating 
environment for acceptance of the reformed military. 
a. Conducting Public Debates and Talk Shows  
By conducting public debates and creating a forum for open discussion on current 
issues among the ministers, political leadership, expertise and the general population, the 
media had performed several roles together. It informed and educated the population and 
decision makers, liaised with the government, helped the government boost its 
legitimacy, and to some extent, maintained oversight on the government’s activities. Talk 
shows, on the other hand, explored “burning issues and tough questions on current 
political and social challenges fired at top notch decision makers and their counter.”166 
166 “Fireside,” Kantipur Television, accessed on February 14, 2015, 
http://kantipurtv.com/programs/fireside.  
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All television channels of Nepal conduct more than one talk show every week.167 
Television channels also introduce new programs focusing on relevant issues. For 
example, the Kantipur Television conducts weekly talk shows named Naya Sambhidhan 
(or New Constitution) to discuss the development of the writing of the constitution, in 
which political leaders, the chairman and the members of the CA, and experts present 
their views.168  By putting related actors on camera, this program informs the public 
about progress in creating the constitution, analyzes the problem areas, presents advice to 
the leaders, and suggests possible outcomes.  
One of the most influential and popular weekly debate programs in Nepalese 
media is “Sajha Sawal” (English meaning: “Common Questions”), launched by the BBC 
World Service Trust since 2007, which is broadcast simultaneously on one Television 
show, the BBC Nepali Radio Service, and 55 other FM stations in Nepal.169 This 
program has a tremendous impact because it raises the concerns of the population and 
provides answers from authorities. For example, in the debate program on December 11, 
2011, then Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai discussed his tenure. This opportunity 
allowed the prime minister to clarify the public’s concerns directly, and explained how 
his four priorities—peace, the constitution, good governance and economic prosperity—
are being addressed. During this show, Anchor mentioned criticisms of his government 
and listed the issues the government has failed to address. In return, the prime minister 
explained the circumstances, acknowledged weaknesses, and discussed future plans in 
which some of the audience expressed their dissatisfactions as well.170 Such interactions 
let the prime minister know the public’s opinion about the government’s activities.  
167 There are total ten television channels in Nepal, and each channel conducts different kinds of 
debate programs and talk shows. See “TV Channels of Nepal,” accessed on March 6, 2015, 
http://www.ranker.com/list/tv-channels-of-nepal/tv-channels. 
168 “Naya Sambidhan  [New Constitution],” accessed on February 14, 2015, 
http://kantipurtv.com/programs/naya-sambidhan. 
169 UNICEF, “Sajha Sawal (Common Questions),” March 21, 2011, 
http://www.comminit.com/communicating_children/content/sajha-sawal-common-questions. 
170 “Performance of PM Bhatterai’s Government in First 100 Days,” February 22, 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mK--uGpJ7xE. 
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Moreover, debate programs could also function as oversight mechanisms and 
assist in enhancing the rule of law. For example, in one episode, a local barber 
complained to the home minister that the police are not pursuing the recovery of his 
abducted sons despite knowing the suspects. The minister assured him that necessary 
action would be taken. Within a week his son was at home, and although police could not 
catch the suspects, the father of the abducted person visited the newsmaker and thanked 
him for his assistance.171  
The debate on the integration of the Maoist combatants in the NA was another 
example of the media’s contribution in bringing the government, opposition leaders, an 
international agency and the population together to discuss controversial issues. 
Otherwise, the government and the opposition parties were reluctant to continue 
dialogues because of their differing views. In the forum of 65 episodes of the Sajha 
Sawal, senior Maoist leader, the opposition in the CA the Nepali Congress Party (NC), 
and Ian Martin, chairman of the United Nations Missions in Nepal (UNMIN)172 were 
present.  
During discussions, the NC and UCPM leaders’ opinions were contradictory. The 
NC leader argued that no clause of the peace agreement mandates integration of the 
Maoist combatant in the NA. For his part, the UCPM leader stated that there will be no 
compromise. The participants also expressed their views and raised questions. A local 
female, Ms. Anjali Jha raised a concern about the consequences of integration and 
questioned the UCPM leader. She asked the following: what would be the consequences 
if considering Maoist integration as an example, several other armed groups in the 
country fighting for their ethnic rights demanded to integrate their fighters in the military 
171 Narayan Shrestha, “Sajha Sawal: A Story of Success,” BBC Media Action (blog), August 24, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/bbcmediaaction/entries/ae430c67-047b-36e2-9e59-0b612a24f3e1. 
172 “The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is a special political mission in support of the 
peace process in Nepal. It was established in response to the letter to the Secretary-General sent on 9 
August 2006, in which the then Seven-Party Alliance Government and the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) requested United Nations’ assistance in creating a free and fair atmosphere for the election of the 
Constituent Assembly and the entire peace process.” See “About UNMIN,” UNMIN- Archive Site, 
http://www.un.org.np/unmin-archive/?d=about&p=mandate.  
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as a precondition of joining a peaceful negotiation?173 Her concern was genuine because 
a Nepalese armed violence survey has indicated that “between 20 and 100 armed groups 
are believed to be operating in the country.”174 These discussions helped to prepare 
nationwide interest and political leadership to understand public opinion and each other’s 
perspectives, which facilitate the adoption of appropriate mechanisms to solve the 
problem. 
b. Exercising External Oversight  
The external oversight of formal democratic institutions increases transparency 
and makes such institutions more accountable. Formal oversight includes the mechanisms 
created under the executive, judicial and the legislative branches; on the other hand, the 
media can exercise oversight as an external independent mechanism.175 Because such 
formal oversight organizations established during the transitional period as parliamentary 
committees, MOD, and NSC were also enhancing their capabilities, the media played an 
effective oversight role during the course of political change in Nepal. 
(1) During the Maoist Conflict  
The media covered the incidents of misconduct by both fighting parties that not 
only informed the population but also brought a wider range of attention to the issue. 
Such coverage has also generated pressure on conflicting groups. For example, the media 
coverage on the incident of extrajudicial killing of 19 Maoists and civilians by the 
military in the eastern part of Nepal, Doramba brought the issue to nationwide attention. 
All forms of the media highlighted this incident and broadcast the conflicting claims. The 
NA stated that the incident occurred during crossfire between the security forces and the 
Maoist combatants, after Maoists combatants opened fire upon security forces.176 
173 “Sajha Sawal Episode 65: Role of UNMIN in Army Integration,” July 27, 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlKAtceQx7I.  
174 “Nepal Armed Violence Assessment,” Small Arms Survey, accessed on February 26, 2015, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/focus-projects/nepal-armed-violence-assessment.html. 
175 Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 76. 
176 “Bhidanta Ma 17 Maobadi ko Mritu [17 Maoists Died in Crossfire],” Kantipur Dainik [Kantipur 
Daily], Bhadra 2, 2060 (BS) [August 18, 2003].  
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However, Maoists claimed that “those killed were allegedly shot dead in the custody of 
the security forces.”177 Amnesty International reported that “government troops … 
marched 19 other suspected Maoists away, later standing them in a row and shooting 
them dead.”178 The Kathmandu Post in its editorial notes how the government reached its 
conclusion of forming a committee: 
The Doramba killings rightly drew public ire last month. Just about 
everyone was stunned by its timing—that it should happen while the 
government and Maoist negotiators were holding onto a fragile cease-fire 
in the peace talks in Hapure. Human rights groups, notably Amnesty 
International, and civil society leaders quickly demanded a probe into the 
August 17 incident. But it was only after the public pressures peaked did 
the National Human Rights Commission dispatch a team to Ramechhap to 
investigate the allegations that the army personnel had shot at the Maoists 
while they were holding a secret meeting.179  
In addition, Damakant Jayshi argues that although the NA conducted a court 
martial and punished the local commander, “let us not forget how this was made possible 
in the first place. It was the press which wrote about the deaths, thus enabling the RNA to 
act.”180  The statement of Damakant Jayshi and the editorial of the Kathmandu post also 
illustrate that the media brought the incident into the limelight and informed the 
population about the misconduct of the armed forces. The incident occurred during the 
cease fire, the military and the Maoists made contradictory claims, and the media 
coverage increased the concern over the incident and pressured the government to find 
the truth. Within a month, the government formed a committee to investigate the issue. 
Furthermore, the media had continuously shown concern and condemned the 
atrocities of the Maoists insurgencies in several incidents of kidnapping, looting, 
vandalizing, and killing of unarmed people. Publicizing the Maoists’ violence against 
177 Jan Sharma, “10 Years Ago: Maoists Call Truce Recess‚ Govt Ready,” Himalayan Times, August 
27, 2013, News ID=388845. 
178 Liam Cochrane, “Massacre of Maoists Threatens Nepal’s Peace Process,” World Politics Review, 
March 29, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/667/massacre-of-maoists-threatens-nepals-
peace-process.    
179 “Doramba Abuses,” Kathmandu Post, September 24, 2003, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/news/news-detail.php?news_id=321. 
180 Damakant Jayshi, “Under the Sun,” Kathmandu Post, March 14, 2005, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2005/03/14/related_articles/under-the-sun/34286.html. 
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civilians, the media succeeded in generating pressure on the Maoist insurgents. For 
instance, the publication of the picture of a school headmaster named Muktinath 
Adhikari, who was taken hostage by the Maoist fighters—while he was teaching in a 
class—tied to a tree and killed,181 outraged the public. Moreover, on several occasions 
the exposer of atrocities by the media has led to investigations from human rights 
organizations as well. In one incident that occurred on 6 June, 2005, the Maoist 
insurgents ambushed a civilian transport carrying more than 130 passengers in which 38 
peoples died and several were injured.182 BBC also condemned the incident claiming it to 
be “the single bloodiest incident involving civilians.”183 The media coverage of the 
incident brought world-wide criticism against the Maoist violence, which also led to 
investigations from NHRC.  
The media also raised the issue of a child soldier among the Maoists. The news 
stated the following: “of the 91 people known to have joined the Maoists and taken up 
arms in Lahan VDC in Jajarkot district, 13 were under 15 years old,184 captured public 
attention. Moreover, Amnesty International also mentioned the practice of child labor: 
“An article …on a website sympathetic to the Maoists acknowledged the scale of 
recruitment of children especially girls. ‘A large number of children in the rural areas are 
now contributing substantially in the guerilla war by way of collection and exchange of 
information, etc.’”185 Although this issue was solved after the Maoists joined the peace 
process and UNMIN verified 2394 Maoists combatants as child soldiers,186 the media 
181Malika Aryal “Open Wounds,” Nepali Times Weekly, (05 February – 11 February), 
http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=16781#.VOD5maPTn5o.  
182 National Human Rights Commission, Preliminary Monitoring/Investigation Report on the Incident 
of Ambush and Explosion Carried out by CPN (Maoist) in Kalyanpur VDC, Chitwan District, June 6, 2005, 
http://www.raonline.ch/pages/pdf/NHRC_chitwan.pdf.  
183“Dozens die’ in Nepal bus blast,” BBC News, last updated June, 7, 2005. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4612633.stm.  
184 Amnesty International, “Nepal A Spiraling Human Rights Crisis,” in Understanding the Maoist 
Movement of Nepal, ed. Deepak Thapa (Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003): 296.  
185 Ibid.  
186 “Nepal: UN Hails Release of All Child Soldiers by Maoists,” UN News Center, accessed on 
February 26, 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33696#.VOEWx6PTn5o. 
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coverage succeeded in generating pressure against the Maoist insurgents throughout the 
period of the insurgency. 
(2) During the Peaceful Demonstrations of 2006 
The media also effectively supervised and brought the government’s activities, 
particularly use of force against peaceful demonstrations to public and the international 
media during the people’s movements of 2006. Shah complimented the media’s critical 
stance against the autocratic regime: “No other sector perhaps played a greater role from 
within civil society than the media in putting the government on the defensive.… Most of 
the major private sector newspapers, radio stations, and television channels … combined 
effort was able to sway public opinion in favor of regime change.”187 All three forms of 
media: print, audio and visual, continuously covered the use of force and highlighted the 
increasing frequency of violence after the King assumed the power.188   
The Nepalese media’s effort not only exposed the government’s misconduct but 
also brought international attention because world-wide media also covered the 
movements significantly. For example, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
published news claiming, “The U.S. strongly criticized King Gyanendra and called on 
him to restore democracy.”189 It also quoted the U.S. State Department: “It is time for the 
king recognizes that this is the best way to deal with the Maoist insurgency and to return 
peace and prosperity in Nepal,”190 On the other hand, CNN also described one incident 
as, “Police fired 70 rounds … A 9-year-old child was also wounded.” It also quotes State 
Department spokesman Sean McCormack: “The United States is also demanding King 
Gyanendra loosen his grip on power and “begin a dialogue” with the country’s political 
parties.”191 The message received from international communities due to the wider 
187 Shah, Civil Society in Uncivil Places, viii. 
188 According to INSEC report, “in all 599 were killed after 1 February till 3 May 2005.” See “Nepal: 
One Hundred Days of Royal Takeover and Intensified Human Rights Crisis: 1 February–11 May 2005,” 
INSEC, http://www.nepalisamajuk.com/misc/News/NEPAL100-dayreport/NEPAL100-dayreport.htm. 
189 “Dozens Injured in Nepal Clashes,” BBC News, April 11, 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4898402.stm.  
190 Ibid. 
191 Satinder Bindra, “Nepal Defies Shoot-On-Sight Curfew,” CNN.com, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/04/11/nepal.protests/index.html. 
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coverage of the media increased pressure on the government and prevented it from using 
excessive force against unarmed protesters. 
c. After the Political Transition of 2006 
The media also exposed the hidden interest of the UCPM to join a peace process 
and capture state power, which brought a nationwide debate on the real objectives of this 
party. On 4 May 2009, the Image Channel Television released a video in which, the then 
prime minister and the UCPM chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal was addressing the Maoist 
combatant commanders and fighters.192 By the next day, every television channel 
repeatedly broadcast it. In a video, Dahal admits that the real strengths of the combatants 
were not more than 8000, but they succeed in deceiving the UNMIN and other political 
parties and registered 30,000 combatants. He further admits, despite joining the peace 
process, the party was planning for an ultimate revolt. He also explains the strategy of the 
party to control the military and capture the state.  
Although, the UCPM arranged the press conference and tried to clarify the issue, 
it has already created a huge controversy and polarized the political situation of the 
country. It also generated nationwide debate on the jurisdiction of the executive on 
military control. Until the video exposed the Maoist plan, people and other political 
leaders had not analyzed the government’s decision of sacking the COAS through this 
angle: as a plan of the UCPN to control the army. Rather, they had considered this issue 
as a personality clash between the prime minister and COAS. In the absence of the video, 
the UCPM could have formed the government again because they were the largest party 
in the CA and the continuation of the same coalition would have made that possible. 
However, the media had changed the political situation of the country.  
d. Softening the Issues and Creating an Environment for Accepting a 
Reformed Military 
On one hand, broadcast media contributed to moderating the issue of the 
integration of the Maoist combatants through debates in a different forum. On the other 
192 “The Real Face of Prachanda,” assessed on February 18, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-neqwS3aws.  
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hand, print media also endeavoured to soften the integration issue. It had remained one of 
the most controversial issues after the political transition of 2006 because initially, other 
political parties and the NA had not accepted the Maoists’ demand of integrating all 
verified combatants. The media played a positive role in creating an acceptable 
environment. For example, the national daily newspaper, Kathmandu Post published 
news with a headline “PLA integration: [the] Nepal Army gets more flexible,” and inside 
it quotes the senior leader of the combatants saying, “We have noted that the Nepal Army 
has demonstrated maximum flexibility…. If other parties reciprocate with open hearts to 
settle the rank issue, we can immediately start the process of integration.”193 Moreover, it 
also quotes the prime ministers political advisor and senior political leader, Devendra 
Paudel: “The Army has told the government that it will have no reservations on any 
political decision taken by the parties to settle the ranks. The proposal is positive and we 
believe that it will help us take the integration process to a conclusion.”194 A positive 
remark from the UCPN leaders and combatants about the NA in a national newspaper 
illustrates the media’s encouraging approach. The media’s efforts not only brought 
conflicting views in front of society and the international community, but also created the 
environment where leaders of different parties could discuss.  
By informing the people about military affairs, the media has also tried to create 
the environment of acceptance of the military in a new political context. The Kathmandu 
Post published the news about the military stating that “Nepal Army recruitment getting 
more inclusive,” and gave two clear messages to the public and political leadership: the 
military is strictly abiding with political decisions, and it is also welcoming the 
marginalized people of the society. It also quotes Retired Brig. Gen. Ranadhoj Limbu: 
“The evolution for inclusiveness in the Nepal Army has just begun…. It should reflect 
the aspirations of the changed political context.”195 Highlighting the enrollment of the 16 
193 Phanindra Dahal and Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “PLA Integration: Nepal Army Gets More Flexible,” 
Kathmandu Post, February 16, 2012.  
194 Ibid.  




                                                 
among 40 officers from indigenous groups of people, lower castes, and residents of 
geographically backward regions, the news appreciates the effort of the NA to make it the 
army of the people.196 This incident would have gone unnoticed because recruitment in 
the military is a regular process, but such information helps to change people’s 
perceptions and improve acceptance of the NA in a new environment. Otherwise, despite 
the abolition of monarchy, the NA is still blamed for being the army of the king, 
controlled by the elite class.  
D. NAGARIK SAMAJ  
During different stages of political movements, Nagarik Samaj has filled the 
space between the government and citizens by mainly focusing its activities on promoting 
democracy and supporting good governance. This group of volunteers from wider areas 
of society act as an informal organization as Nagarik Samaj provides neither membership 
nor functions as an established formal office. As an editorial of the Nepali newspaper, the 
Kantipur Dainik (or Daily), mentions, Nagarik Samaj of Nepal is not a group but a 
revolution guided by the wisdom of the people.197 Thus, with a positive spirit of 
representing society, Nagarik Samaj has contributed significantly during the key political 
transition of Nepal. 
1. Peaceful Transformation of Maoist Conflict and Establishment of 
Democracy 
Nagarik Samaj’s role has two different dimensions during the peaceful 
transformation of the Maoist conflict and political movement of 2006. Initially, it helped 
the government to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table by bridging the gap between 
the government and Maoist leadership. When the King Gyanendra again resumed power 
in 2005, however, the group’s role “shifted from leading [the] peace negotiation between 
the government and the Maoist to joining in political opposition against the 
196 Ibid. 
197 “Nagarik Khabardari ko Artha [Meaning of the Warning from the Citizens],” Kantipur Dainik 
[Kantipur Daily], Kartik 17, 2067 (BS) [November 3, 2010].  
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government.”198 This swift change was a result of the king’s suppression of democracy 
and his efforts to implement autocracy. 
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba formed a committee, the Barta Sarokar 
Samiti (or committee concerned with the peace talks)199 in August 2001 under the 
chairmanship of Nagarik Samaj activist, Sundar Mani Dikshit, and gave him the 
responsibility to facilitate the negotiation between the government and the Maoists.200  
According to Prashant Jha, Deverandra Raj Pandey, a prominent activist of Nagarik 
Samaj, met the UCPM chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal as well.201  
The government, on the other hand, had also declared a ceasefire to foster the 
environment. The joint effort brought a positive result and negotiations began. Nagarik 
Samaj had no role in discussions because it was not the part of a dialogue team, but it 
swayed the public opinion toward peace. Although, the negotiation failed to reach a 
positive conclusion, Nagarik Samaj’s effort had received a positive response from the 
political leadership and the population. 
Despite the failure of the peace talks, Nagarik Samaj continued its efforts. When 
the new government formed, it also proposed to create the National Peace Commission 
(NPC) on a broad front to negotiate with the Maoists, which the government rejected 
because Nagarik Samaj was seeking an active and influential role in that forum.202 
Although, the government denied its formal involvement, Nagarik Samaj had continued 
its informal effort to ensure “keeping the democratic conversation going on.”203 
According to Bishnu Raj Upreti, as a confidence building measure it “slowly engaged 
contacting warring parties, creating [a] platform for the debate and discussions, and 
198 Shah, Civil Society in Uncivil Places, 26. 
199 This committee was later renamed as Barta Sarokar Nagarik Samiti (or Civil Society for Peace and 
Development). 
200 Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Hemraj Subedee, “Nepal: Civil Society a Moral Force in 
Selflessness and Impartiality,” Telegraphnepal.com, March 21, 2013. 
http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2013-03-21/nepal:-civil-society-a-moral-force-in-selflessness-and-
impartiality. 
201 Jha, Battles of the New Republic, 99. 
202 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 5. 
203 Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 80. 
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working as a channel between the warring parties.”204 In 2004, when the UCPM 
affiliated student union had waged a campaign for the closing of all private boarding 
schools, and its trade union had called strikes on industrial sectors, Nagarik Samaj 
contacted the leaders of both unions and successfully negotiated for the opening of 
schools and industries.205 These efforts communicated a positive message and helped to 
maintain links with the UCPM leaders. 
2. Liaising with the Maoists and Mainstream Political Parties 
Nagarik Samaj successfully contributed in accomplishing two major roles during 
the political movement of 2006. First, its activists played an effective role in bringing the 
leaders of the UCPM and the leaders of mainstream political parties together and in 
creating favorable grounds to formulate an alliance against the king, called the Seven 
Party Alliance (SPA).206 On one hand, according to Jeeven Baniaya, several activists of 
Nagarik Samaj engaged in consultations with all relevant actors:  
Devendra Raj Panday, Krishna Khanal and Shyam Shrestha … met 
secretly with Maoist leaders Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda and 
Baburam Bhattarai in Haryana India in September 2005 and tried to 
convince the Maoists to formally join multiparty democracy and peace 
process…. After the meeting, the Maoists leaders tried to give their 
assurances that they were ready to join the multiparty democracy if the 
political parties did decide to support a constituent assembly. In addition, 
they also discussed the possibilities and need to establish a republican 
state, secularism and state restructuring. For their part, the…activists 
assured the Maoists that they would lobby and pressurize the political 
parties support the republic. Following their return from the meeting, these 
activists lobbied the agitating party leadership to adopt the agenda of 
204 Bishnu Raj Upreti, Political Change and Challenges of Nepal Volume 2: Reflection on Armed 
Conflict, Peace Process and State Building (Saarbrucken, Germany: LAP LAMBERT Academic 
Publishing, 2010), 99. 
205 Upreti, Political Change and Challenges of Nepal, 99.  
206 The seven party alliances consist of major political parties of Nepal of that period. It includes 
Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist 
(CPN-UML), Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandi Devi), Nepal Peasants and Workers Party , United People’s 
Front, and United Left Front. 
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constituent assembly and build an alliance with the Maoists to fight 
against the King.207 
On the other hand, other activists such as, “Krishna Pahadi, Daman Nath 
Dhungana, Padma Ratna Tuladar … played a key role pushing the political parties … 
closer.”208  These efforts kept the political leadership engaged to continue their dialogue. 
Later SPA signed a written agreement among them. Although activists of Nagarik Samaj 
were not present while SPA signed an agreement, its continuous efforts facilitated 
building joint alliances of political leadership including the Maoists against the king. 
Since the government of Nepal has declared the Maoists to be terrorists, which was 
supported by several western countries including the United States,209 the formation of 
this alliance has marked a watershed in Nepal’s political history.  
3. Informing and Arousing the Populations about the Democratic 
Movement 
Nagarik Samaj also formed a group, the Citizens Movement for Peace and 
Democracy (CMPD) and launched a nationwide campaign to motivate the population to 
participate in the democratic movement. According to Shah, the formation of CMPD was 
a “conceptual shift from civil society as a forum for debate and civic pressure to civil 
society as a political movement against the state.”210 Pandey claims that, the “CMDP was 
responsible for igniting the movement at a time when the general public was not in a 
mood to listen to the call of the SPA or participate in their programs. After CMDP had 
achieved some success in the programs it launched in Kathmandu, “civil societies” 
cropped up all over the country.”211 Nagarik Samaj also “appealed to both the Maoists 
and the government to announce a cease-fire…. Indeed the Maoists declared a unilateral 
207 Jeevan Baniya, “Civil Society, Social Movements and Democratization: A Case Study of Nepal,” 
PhD diss, University of Oslo, 2014, 320. 
208 Jha, Battles of the New Republic, 99. 
209 The State Department dropped the UCPN from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations on 2012 only. 
See “State Department Drops Maoists from Terrorist Watch List,” Washington Times, September 6, 2012, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/6/us-removes-nepal-communists-from-terrorist-list/    
210 Shah, Civil Society in Uncivil Places, 26. 
211 Pandey, “Social Movement, Civil Society and Regime Change in Nepal,” 11. 
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three-month long cease-fire.”212 Because this announcement demonstrated the Maoists’ 
willingness to change their course, it also enhanced confidence among the SPA.  
CMDP awakened the masses including unemployed people and lower level 
laborers to participate in the movement. It also arranged, according to Rajat KC, “lodging 
and feeding of the Maoist cadre, who were brought to Kathmandu to take part in the 
people’s movement.”213 The participation of the Maoist cadres in peaceful 
demonstrations at the capital city would not have been possible without Nagarik Samaj’s 
assistance because the government had not announced a cease fire. In this way, Nagarik 
Samaj successfully contributed to establishing democracy and peacefully transforming 
the Maoist insurgents.214  
4. Participating in Conferences and Seminars  
After the political change of 2006, several conferences and seminars have been 
conducted with the support of international communities and donor agencies. Although 
Nagarik Samaj does not have an influential role in these events, it has participated and 
advised decision makers on policy matters. Different agencies are involved in organizing 
such programs after the political change of 2006. For example, according to the data of 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Nepal, this institution and its partner organizations have 
organized 299 seminars and workshops from 2006 to 2014 (see Table: 1).215  
212 Baniya, “Civil Society, Social Movements and Democratization: A Case Study of Nepal,” 319. 
213 Rajat KC, “Civil Society and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” Scoop Independent News, 
September 6, 2006, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0609/S00066/civil-society-and-the-maoist-
insurgency-in-nepal.htm.  
214 Bhatta, “Civil Society in Nepal: In Search of Reality,” 50. 
215 “Seminar/Workshop Reports,” FES-Nepal, assessed on February 14, 2015. 
http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/seminar_reports.htm. 
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Table 1.   Number of Seminars/Workshops Conducted by FES and its Partner 
Organizations  
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Numbers  18 37 28 39 38 32 31 37 39 
Source: “Seminar/Workshop Reports,” FES Nepal216 
These seminars focused mainly on the subjects related to the consolidation 
process such as: CMR in Nepal; the role of the media in constitution making; 
strengthening state capacity for conflict resolutions; building the modern state through 
the constitutional process etc. The Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) is another 
non-profit organization that conducts seminars on different issues. Nagarik Samaj has 
been represented in most of these seminars. During the seminar on “Building Modern 
State through Constitutional Process,” the representative of Nagarik Samaj, Ram Narayan 
claimed that “[a] lack of ideological convergence among the parties on the constitution 
and a tendency of each party to impose its own ideology created a situation of deadlock 
in Nepal,”217 and urged the political leaders to act as national leaders not as party 
activists.  
The U.S. Embassy in Nepal had also organized a workshop on “Democratic 
Transition and Security Sector Reform on July 20, 2007” at Kathmandu. Along with 
national participants, experts from the South Asia Center for Policy Studies (SACEPS), 
the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), and the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR) were also present at the workshop. The workshop was designed “to 
build a consensus on Nepal’s core values, national interests, and national objectives,” and 
presented its findings and recommendations to the government of Nepal.218 Organization 
of such a seminar has significantly supported the democratic consolidation in Nepal. 
216 This table is created by the author from data on the web page of FES. See “Seminar/Workshop 
Reports.”  
217 “Building Modern State through Constitutional Process,” Seminar Report, FES Nepal, 
http://www.fesnepal.org/reports/2010/seminar_reports/report_fes_gaur-rautahat.htm .  
218 Embassy of the United States, Kathmandu, Nepal. “Democratic Transition and Security Sector 
Reform,” press release, July 20, 2007. http://nepal.usembassy.gov/pr_07-20-20010-.html. 
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5. Participating in Rallies and Protest 
Furthermore, throughout the period since the election of the CA in 2008, Nagarik 
Samaj has generated pressure upon political leadership by conducting a series of 
activities such as protests, rallies, public speeches, and press releases. These activities 
have also made the voice of the general citizens audible to the political leadership at the 
decision making level. For example, it conducted 48-hour sit-in protests in front of the 
CA building,219 organized rallies and conducted public speeches demanding consensus 
among the political leadership. It urged the CA members to implement the constitution by 
reaching a consensus among the parties, not through voting by majority members. 
Nagarik Samaj also “urged the leadership to focus on dialogues and discussion,”220 and 
cautioned the political leadership that the dissatisfied masses might not accept the 
constitution if implemented by approving it through a majority members’ vote. Through 
these activities, Nagarik Samaj has liaised and conveyed the people’s opinion and 
cautioned the leaders against making wrong decisions.  
E. HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS  
Human rights organizations have monitored the conditions of human rights during 
different periods of political upheaval, and raised concerns about violations. To 
accomplish this role, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal has 
worked independently and with other national and international organizations. Dahal 
claims that, “human rights organizations [have] also acted as watchdogs.”221 The 
mobilization of the military against the Maoist insurgents’ had increased vulnerability of 
the people because incidents of violations of human rights had also increased. In these 
circumstances, human rights organizations, according to Dahal, have been “involved in 
fact-finding about disappearance[s] and extrajudicial killing[s] and organizing activities 
against the wanton violation of human rights by political parties, the state machinery and 
219 “Civil Society Concludes 48-Hour Sit-In,” ekantipur.com, February 27, 2010, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/02/27/top-story/civil-society-concludes-48-hour-sit-in/309213.html. 
220 “Civil Society Urges Big Three to Extend CA Tenure,” eKantipur.com, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/05/17/top-story/civil-society-urges-big-three-to-extend-ca-
tenure/314484.html. 
221 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 20. 
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Maoists.”222 By monitoring the condition of human rights, it has performed the duty of 
watchdog, and by investigating and bringing the culprits into the judicial system, it has 
helped to enhance the government’s legitimacy. Moreover, the published reports have 
made the general public aware of their rights as well.  
In several instances, human rights organizations have conducted detailed 
investigations on violations by both conflicting parties and helped in implementing the 
rule of law. For example, a five member committee formed by the NHRC under the 
chairmanship of Ex- Justice of the Supreme Court Krishna Jung Rayamajhi investigated 
“the alleged encounter between the security forces and the CPN (Maoist) at Doramba”223 
that took the lives of 19 personnel. Before the investigation, the NA had claimed that they 
were killed in retaliation when the Maoist combatants had fired on its patrol; the Maoists 
had claimed that the NA killed them after capturing them. This team visited the spot, and 
conducted an investigation. It determined that “they had been fired at from a close range, 
with their hands tied at the back, and they had died due to that very reason,”224 and 
demanded further judicial actions. Initially, “Army officials have challenged the NHRC 
over the findings by its independent experts.”225 However, “After the NHRC made public 
its findings, the Army promised to re-examine the case,”226 and conducted a court-
martial and punished the local commander for two violations: extra-judicial killing, and 
misreporting the incident.227 In another incident, the death of a 15-year-old detainee in a 
military camp, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
demanded an independent investigation, involvement of the independent agency and the 
hand-over of the suspect to the police. Although, the NA did not hand-over the suspect to 
222 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal,  28. 
223 Report of the National Human Rights Commission, 2060 BS (2003), 
http://www.nhrcnepal.org/nhrc_new/doc/newsletter/Reprot_Doramba_R.pdf.  
224 Ibid, 12. 
225 “NHRC Seeks Justice for Doramba Victims,” Kathmandu Post, August 17, 2013, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/08/17/nation/nhrc-seeks-justice-for-doramba-
victims/252507.html.  
226 “Unlawful Killings and Summary Executions by Nepali Security Forces,” accessed on February 
16, 2015, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal1004/4.htm. 
227Jayshi, “Under the Sun.” 
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the Nepal Police (NP), it conducted a court martial and convicted three men with the 
charge of ‘“employing improper interrogation techniques.”228 These examples illustrate 
human rights organizations effective involvement in exercising informal oversight of the 
government. 
On the other hand, human rights organizations have closely monitored the 
activities of the Maoist insurgents and reacted appropriately. For example, the NHRC 
also investigated an incident when the Maoist insurgents ambushed a public transport 
filled with civilians. Investigation found that some of the military personnel in civil dress 
with arms were also travelling in that bus. The NHRC team determined that “the use of 
civilian mode of transportation by the security personnel… in civil dress and with arms” 
put the lives of civilians in danger and violated the provisions of human rights.229 It 
urged the government to ensure that the security personnel “should immediately refrain 
from endangering the lives of ordinary passengers by traveling on public vehicles with or 
without uniform with arms.”230 It also demanded that the Maoist leadership “should 
assist the Commission in its investigation of the incident by providing it with details of 
the decision makers, planners and those who carried out the attack as per Geneva 
Conventions which entail individual responsibility.”231 Publication of the report made a 
positive impact since the government ordered the NA not to use public transport for a 
military purpose.  
In addition to monitoring, with the help of the media and other International Non-
Governmental Organizations (INGOs), human rights organizations also succeeded in 
generating pressure for the release of security personnel by negotiating with their 
captors.232 Likewise, on 30 April 2004, after informal negotiations by civil society, the 
Maoist leadership released “38 members of the Nepal Police and one civil servant 
228 United Nations Human Rights, Nepal Conflict Report: Executive Summary, 2012 (Geneva: Office 
of High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012). 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NP/OHCHR_ExecSumm_Nepal_Conflict_report2012.pdf.  
229 National Human Rights Commission, Preliminary Monitoring/Investigation Report. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Dahal, Civil Society Groups in Nepal, 19, 31. 
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recently captured … by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) and handed 
[them] over to the [representatives of] International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC).”233  
During the periods of insurgency from February 1996 to 21 November 2006, 
human rights organizations analyzed “a database of approximately 30,000 documents and 
cases sourced from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), national and 
international NGOs and from OHCHR.”234 They determined violations of international 
law in over 2,000 incidents, ill-treatment in over 2,500 cases, and transmitted 672 cases 
of disappearances to the Government of Nepal for further investigation.235 During the 
people’s movement in 2006, human rights organizations continuously monitored 
violations of human rights: “In all 599 were killed after 1 February till 3 May 2005, 
almost double the daily monthly average before the takeover.”236 In this way, human 
rights observations have significantly contributed to the political transition through close 
observations of human rights situations. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Different civil society groups have played a significant role during Nepal’s 
transition to democracy along with its own development after the restoration of 
democracy in 1990. Through public debates and talk shows, the media has informed the 
public and liaised with the government. These programs have also facilitated the policy 
formulation process because the political leadership learns from experts’ ideas, knows 
public opinion, and identifies solutions to conflicting views through arguments. During 
the conflict, the media has exercised oversight by bringing fighting parties’ misconduct to 
public notice, which has led to investigations. It also helped to pacify controversial issues 
such as integrating rebels into the national army, and also circulated a positive message to 
the public about the military being inclusive. By playing watchdog, the media also 
233 ICRC Resource Center, “Nepal: 39 Detainees Released,” news release, April 30, 2004, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5yjkr5.htm. 
234 United Nations Human Rights, Nepal Conflict Report, 3.  
235 Ibid, 7–9. 
236 “Nepal: One Hundred Days of Royal Takeover.” 
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generated international pressure and prevented the king from using excessive force 
against peaceful protesters. Moreover, by revealing the UCPM’s strategy of capturing 
states, it prevented the military from being politicized. It also highlighted conditions in 
which democratically elected executives could misuse or exploit the military to achieve 
undemocratic goals. Such a possibility also indicated the need for effective control or 
oversight mechanisms.  
The Nagarik Samaj receives significant credit for its contributions to the peaceful 
transformation of the Maoists from violent conflict to mainstream politics. It succeeded 
in bringing the Maoist insurgents to the negotiation table when the government was 
determined to seek a peaceful solution. After the king’s takeover, once again it succeeded 
in aligning the mainstream political parties and the Maoists against the king’s autocratic 
regime. Finally, it also played a significant role in inspiring public participation in 
democratic movements launched by the SPA. After the transformation of the country to a 
republic, it is contributing by sharing expertise and pressuring the political leadership 
through rallies, protests and demonstrations. Thus, from these activities, it has informed 
people, liaised with the government, and also advised the political leadership on policy 
issues. 
Throughout the political transition, human rights organizations have exercised 
oversight mechanisms by raising concerns of all kinds of human rights violations. By 
investigating the misconduct by the government forces and bringing the lawbreakers 
under judicial procedures, the NHRC has also helped to boost the government’s 
legitimacy. On the other hand, by investigating and reporting the atrocities of the Maoist 
insurgents, it has also brought wider attention and generated pressure on the Maoist 
leadership.  
The positive contributions of different civil society groups can be observed from 
the progress achieved during the latest political transition. For example, according to the 
Freedom House ratings of media and civil society, in 2006 Nepal rated as “not free,” its 
lowest ranking. Its freedom rating was “5.5,” its score237 on political rights was “6” and 
237 Freedom house ratings are measured with the score ranging from 1 to 7, and 1 is the best, and 7 is 
the worst. 
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on civil liberty was “5.” By 2014, however, with scores of “4” each on the freedom 
rating, political rights, and civil liberty, Nepal now ranks as “partially free” in the latest 
Freedom House rankings. Although the accuracy of the situation in the ground might 
vary depending on how they collected the data, progress is visible.238  Generally until 
2006, Nepal’s struggle in consolidating democracy has been affected by political 
instability created by the king’s meddling in democratic practices, and the decade-long 
Maoist insurgency. In contrast, after 2006, the conflicting ideologies of different political 
parties have significantly obstructed the process, because the political leadership did not 
establish a common ground for consensus. Although the role of decision makers used to 
be crucial, their efforts seems to be lacking in a Nepalese context; however, efforts of the 




238 “Freedom House: Nepal,” accessed on March 5, 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2014/nepal#.VO0z0aPTk3E. 
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IV. ANALYZING CIVIL SOCIETY’S CONTRIBUTION TO 
DEMOCRATIC CMR DURING POLITICAL TRANSITION  
During the protracted transitional period in Nepal, the slow progress in 
consolidation significantly affected the government’s efforts in augmenting the 
capabilities of its democratic institutions responsible for implementing civilian control. 
Because efforts in articulating the constitution have stalled amid a lack of consensus 
among the leaders, other aspects of consolidation such as the democratic reform of 
security sectors have yet to begin. As such, formal democratic institutions of control such 
as the Ministry of Defense and the National Security Council remained weak. Moreover, 
the presence of weak institutions could not exert effective control and oversight of the 
armed forces, which created unstable democratic CMR in Nepal. Thus, civil society’s 
role is crucial at this moment of stalemate in consolidation because it can influence the 
formal governmental agencies responsible to ensure control and to enhance democratic 
civilian control.  
In addition, by increasing the accountability and transparency of the executive 
branch and the military, civil society also exerts pressure on the government to execute 
its authority on military affairs effectively through formal mechanisms of control. 
However, in the Nepalese context, civil society’s contributions during transitions have 
been more focused on political than on military affairs—perhaps because the Nepal Army 
has accepted all forms of political revolution including transformation from the kingdom 
to the republic. The NA has also chosen to stand for democracy and not with the king’s 
autocratic regime. Therefore, civil society along with the political leadership might not 
consider the NA an imminent threat to democracy, so they have not considered 
democratizing it as a first priority. Either way, roles played by civil society during the 
political transition and democratic consolidation have influenced democratic CMR in 
Nepal.  
To trace this influence and its effects, this chapter will revisit the three civil 
society groups of Chapter III: the media, Nagarik Samaj, and human rights organizations. 
It will analyze their contributions by relating these roles to democratic CMR and the 
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theoretical aspects of control mechanisms. The chapter uses one element, “democratic 
civilian control of the security forces,”239 of the trinity framework presented by Bruneau 
and Matei as guidance.  
A. CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS’ INFLUENCE ON CMR DURING 
POLITICAL TRANSITION  
According to Matei, democratic civilian control “is conceptualized in terms of 
authority over the following: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the 
inculcation of professional norms.” Thus, these three requirements of control will be the 
major basis for analyzing (see Table 2) the levels of influence of the three selected civil 
society groups in CMR during the political transition in Nepal.  
A summary of the findings on Nepal’s civil society influence on democratic CMR 
during political transitions occurred after 1990 is captured in Table 2, introduced below. 
This conclusion is derived by analyzing the role and contribution of each civil society 
group during this period in relation to control requirements. Particular groups’ 
contributions are graded in three levels (low, medium, and high) by relating their 
influence on three control requirements of democratic CMR: institutional control, 
oversight, and professional norms.  
239 Other two elements of trinity framework are effectiveness and efficiency. See Matei, “The Media’s 
Role in Intelligence Democratization, ‘76. 
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Table 2.   Civil Society’s Influence in CMR during Political Transition in 
Nepal240 
 Control 
Requirement Institutional Control 
Mechanism 
Oversight Professional Norms 





















Institutional control mechanisms “involve providing direction and guidance for 
the security forces, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other 
regulations,”241 and adoption of these provisions establishes civilian authorities over the 
military. Oversight involves the civilian authorities monitoring the security forces 
activities “to ensure they are in fact following the direction and guidance they have 
received from the civilian chain of command.”242 Moreover, “professional norms are 
institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, 
education, training, and promotion.”243 The criterion for analysis is determined by 
observing whether the selected three civil society groups influenced these elements of 
democratic civilian control, and if so at what level. Moreover, influence was determined 
by judging how different roles of civil society groups helped to strengthen and enhance 
the capabilities of the government’s democratic civilian control mechanisms.   
B. THE MEDIA 
The media scores high with regard to oversight and medium with regard to 
control and professional norms for its influence on democratic civilian control. This 
240 This table from Matei has been revised to reflect three civil society groups in a Nepalese context. 
See Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 75. 




                                                 
means that the media’s role during the transitional period effectively influenced the 
oversight aspect and had a significant influence on control and professional norms of 
democratic CMR in Nepal. Because the media—either directly engaging with political 
leaders, decision makers, and government authorities or exposing wrongdoing and raising 
alarms about the lack of reforms—have assisted as well as influenced democratic civilian 
control. Additionally, these activities of the media have paved the way for the 
enhancement of the formal control and oversight mechanisms of the states, because they 
pointed out the gaps in the existing system and indicated the need for reform. However, 
the media cannot effectively implement oversight as formal institutions do because it is 
neither a decision making body nor does it have jurisdiction in such matters.  
First, with regards to oversight, by exposing the UCPM’s strategy of capturing 
state power through undemocratic means, which the then prime minister and the UCPM 
chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has admitted in a video, the media has effectively 
influenced civilian control. In this case, the Maoists not only revealed the misconduct of 
the executive, but also prevented the military from being politicized. Second, with regard 
to control, the exposer of misconduct also highlighted several gaps in the existing control 
mechanisms. It indicated that even a democratically elected executive could misuse the 
military, which generated further debates about the requirement for a check and balance 
system on the activities of the executive branch. Third, the debate also raised a question 
about the legitimate authority to control the military: the executive prime minister or the 
ceremonial president, and identified the problem in existing legal provisions including the 
interim constitutions.  
Moreover, the contradictory interpretations of constitutional provisions and the 
legal authority of the prime minister and the president helped to determine the lapses in 
formal control mechanisms of Nepal. The controversy began after the president overruled 
the government’s decision of dismissing COAS of the NA in 2009. One institution 
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blamed the other. The prime minister244  claimed that “the move by President Yadav as 
unconstitutional;”245 whereas the president’s office246 claimed that the government 
violated the norms of the interim constitutions. Mandira Sharma argues that “The 
problem, as usual, is of the studious ambiguity of existing laws. Both the Interim 
Constitution and the Army Act (passed in 2006) are vague in pinpointing the ‘termination 
process’ of an army chief.”247  The opposing arguments from the office of the executive 
and ceremonial head of the state illustrated that the ambiguity in provisions escalated the 
political situation and indicated the need for reform.    
The unclear provisions also led to contradictory interpretations. For example, 
although Article 144 (2) of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 BS (2007) states: 
“The president shall, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers 108, appoint the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Nepal Army;”248 it does not specify the termination process 
clearly. Rather, the revised Army Act 2006 outlines the following: “The Chief of Army 
Staff who is holding office at the time of commencement of this Act shall continue 
his/her office… subject to the provision pursuant to Sub-section (2).”249 This Sub Section 
(2) specifies that “The term of office of the Chief of Army Staff shall be Three 
Years…”250 There was a “parallel writ petitions…before the Supreme Court challenging 
both the prime minister’s decision and the president’s move on constitutional 
244 “The Maoists, who unilaterally decided to kick out General Katawal, held that the stature of the 
president as a ceremonial figure does not allow him to intervene on matters decided by the executive.” 
Mandira Sharma, “Prime Minister versus President,” Himal South Asian: A Review magazine of Political 
Culture, June 2009, http://old.himalmag.com/component/content/article/527-prime-minister-versus-
president.html.  
245 Ibid. 
246 “The president’s office puts forward the logic that the prime minister had transgressed the spirit of 
the interim constitution, which explicitly mentions that “the conduct of business of the government of 
Nepal shall be carried out consistently with the aspirations of the united people’s movement, political 
consensus and culture of mutual cooperation.” See Sharma, “Prime Minister versus President.” 
247 Ibid. 
248 “Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007),” Nepal Law Commission, 107. 
http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=52&func=startdown&id=1
63&lang=en. 
249 “Army Act, 2063 BS (2006),” 9–11, http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org/files/docs/2006-09-
28_legal_govt-of-nepal_eng.pdf. 
250 “Army Act, 2063 BS (2006),” 11. 
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grounds.”251 However, considering the verdict could create serious implications for the 
existing political environment, the Supreme Court “quashed a writ against the president’s 
move.”252  
However, before the Supreme Court dismissed the case, the media had already 
turned the issues into a nationwide debate. In this way, by exposing the misconduct and 
generating debates, the media helped to identify several gaps in formal institutional 
mechanisms of control and oversight in Nepal’s democratic civilian control. Thus, as 
Matei asserts, “In new democracies, the media relevantly influence[s] the control 
dimension of democratic reform.”253 The media in Nepal has created feelings among the 
decision makers about the requirement for strong institutional control mechanisms of the 
armed forces, which the decision makers could accommodate in a new constitution and in 
new security policies.  
In addition, by creating a learning environment for political leaders and the 
decisions makers, and by providing forums for interaction with experts and the general 
public through debate program and talk shows, the media has also contributed to the 
augmentation of formal control and oversight mechanisms. It strengthens control 
mechanisms because recommendations from these interactions could help in policy 
formulation in security affairs. Furthermore, exposure of misconduct by the military such 
as incidents of extra-judicial killing and human rights violations also have had positive 
contributions to increase the professional skills of the armed forces. These incidents 
demonstrated the need to educate military personnel, which would enhance professional 
skills. Since incorporating norms of human rights in training enhances the 
professionalism of the military, the media’s role, in a small way though, has also 
influenced the development of professional norms in the NA.  
251 Sharma, “Prime Minister versus President.” 
252 “SC Junks Writ on Prez’s Katawal Move,” Kathmandu Post, September 30, 2010. 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/09/30/top-story/sc-junks-writ-on-prezs-katawal-
move/213340/. 
253 Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 100. 
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C. NAGARIK SAMAJ  
Nagaric Samaj scores medium with regards to control and low with regard to 
oversight and professional norms for its influence on these three elements of democratic 
civilian control. During the transition, Nagarik Samaj’s roles were mainly focused on 
political activities so it did not influence and shape professional norms and oversight 
aspects of democratic civilian control. However, from its contributions to the 
constitution-drafting process and the capability to influence or pressure the political 
leadership, it has had a significant influence on control. From its activities, Nagarik 
Samaj has inspired political leaders to reform or implement appropriate policies and 
enhance control. However, it cannot drive the country through the transition itself 
because the decision makers of the country lack consensus. 
Until 2006, Nagarik Samaj’s contributions were mainly focused on supporting 
political movements and the restoration of democracy. It contributed to an ideological 
shift of the UCPM from the armed conflict into a multi-party democratic system and 
political parties’ acceptance of Nepal’s shift from a kingdom to a republic. After the 
political change of 2006, Nagarik Samaj has contributed in consolidation in two ways. 
First, it shared its expertise and advised the political leaders on policy matters through 
interactions in debates, seminars, and conferences. Second, it pressured the political 
leaders by organizing rallies, protests and public speeches. Because Nagarik Samaj is 
pursuing the early implementation of a constitution, this act will strengthen the 
institutional capability of democratic control mechanisms through constitutional 
guidance.  
On one hand, Nagarik Samaj has not been involved in military affairs during the 
political transition, so its influence on elements of democratic civilian control appears 
low. On the other hand, it has proven its capabilities in shaping public opinion and 
convincing the leadership during the political movement of 2006. Then, Nagarik Samaj’s 
role was crucial to create an environment in which the UCPM and mainstream political 
parties shifted their political ideological diversely: the Maoists abandoned their main 
ideology of capturing state power by military means; other political parties accepted 
abolishing the monarchy. Moreover, as David S. Pion-Berlin asserts, “civilian control 
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involves the ability of civilians to define goals.”254 Performances of Nagarik Samaj 
illustrate that it can influence the policy formulation process, and policy guidance is 
essential to establish effective control over the military by defining its roles and missions 
to enhance civilian control. Thus, it could be argued, due to its influence on policy 
matters, Nagarik Samaj has had a significant influence on democratic civilian control as 
well.  
In addition, the role of Nagarik Samaj with regards to policy formulation is 
limited to its participation in different forums. On the other hand, the involvement of 
different kinds of NGOs and donor agencies such as Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), the 
Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) and foreign Embassies in organizing seminars, 
and conferences in Nepal has significantly assisted in consolidation. These activities are 
shaping the policy formulation process by providing outcomes of conferences as a 
guideline to the planners and the decision makers. Thus, Nagarik Samaj should exploit 
the expertise of its activists and different NGOs and increase its involvement in 
constitution making by doing research, preparing concept papers on contradictory issues, 
and shaping public opinion. 
D. HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS  
Human rights organizations score medium with regard to all elements of control. 
In this context, throughout the political transition, human rights organizations closely 
monitored the activities of different actors on issues of human rights violations. By doing 
so, they exposed misconduct, investigated issues, cautioned the government and the 
military about wrong doing, and demanded judicial procedures be followed. By exposing 
or investigating this misconduct, human rights organizations have contributed to 
legislation that ultimately strengthens formal democratic control and oversight 
mechanisms as well. In addition, by pursuing the implementation of the rule of law, they 
have identified that the government and the military have not complied with the rule of 
law. This situation further indicated the need for effective oversight mechanisms to 
254 David S. Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” Military Review 
85, no. 1 (January-February 2005): 31. 
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ensure the executive and the military obey the rule of law. Moreover, by exposing the 
weaknesses in the professional conduct of the military such as violations of human rights, 
they have influenced professional norms of the military as well. With these activities, 
human rights organizations have enhanced democratic CMR because due to their efforts, 
the government has reformed the old or adopted new judicial mechanisms. 
Human rights organizations are continuously pursuing cases of human rights 
violations by the military and the Maoists during conflict periods, and pressuring the 
government to execute orders or conduct further investigation to bring unsolved cases 
under legal jurisdiction. For example, the National Human Right Commission (NHCR) 
urged “the government to promptly investigate the case of Krishna Prasad Adhikari, who 
was abducted [on June 2004] and killed by the Maoists during the decade-long 
insurgency,”255 nine years after the incident. Although the government failed to 
implement justice through regular judicial procedures, due to the pressure from the 
UCPM leadership, who demanded the war-time cases be addressed separately, it 
demonstrated the need for reform in the system.  
On the other hand, different human rights organizations are also continuously 
monitoring the military’s conduct on judicial proceedings and bringing it to public notice. 
For example, on Februry 16, 2011, The Kathmandu Post published the news claiming: 
“Marking the seventh anniversary of the alleged torture and killing of 15-year-old 
Sunuwar, UN High Commission for Human Rights in Nepal … Amnesty International, 
the Advocacy Forum Nepal, Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of 
Jurists urged the government to take immediate steps to ensure that criminal proceedings 
move ahead.”256 Although the NA has conducted the court martial and punished the 
officers involved in this incident, these organizations are demanding transparency and 
independent investigations.    
255“NHRC to Govt: Probe Conflict-Era Murder,” Kathmandu Post, August 07, 2013, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/08/07/nation/nhrc-to-govt-probe-conflict-era-
murder/252094.html.   




                                                 
By bringing unsolved cases of human rights violations to the attention of the 
public and the international community, these organizations have generated pressure on 
the government to strengthen its judicial mechanisms. The government is also under 
pressure to investigate, according to the ICRC report 2009, over 1300 personnel 
disappeared257 during conflict period. Continued pressure has forced the government to 
reform and enhance its judicial system. For example, due to the increasing allegations of 
not taking action to end impunity, the government decided to address the cases of 
violations during the conflict period through new judicial procedures, and “the three 
major parties have agreed to bring all war-era cases under the purview of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), [and the Commission on Enforced Disappearance 
(CED)].”258  
Later on 15 April 2014, the government tabled a bill that would authorize the 
creation of the TRC and CED.”259 This step is significant one in consolidation because as 
Kamal Dev Bhattarai claims, “Nepal’s success in writing a new constitution will largely 
depend on how it handles the issue of providing justice for war-era victims through a 
…0020TRC and a … CED.”260 Thus, it could be determined that efforts of human rights 
organizations succeeded in enhancing control and oversight aspects of democratic 
civilian control positively as implementation of the constitution will enhance the 
functioning of democratic control mechanisms 
In addition, the activities of the human rights organizations have also positively 
influenced the professional skills of the military as the NA has enhanced capabilities of 
the Judge Advocate General Department and also “established a dedicated Human Rights 
257 “Families of Missing Persons in Nepal: A study of their needs,” ICRC: April 2009, assessed on 
February 19, 2015, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/families-of-missing-persons-nepal-
report.pdf. 
258 Anil Giri, “Parties agree to bring all war-era cases under TRC,” Kathmandu Post, April 16, 2004, 
http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2014/04/16/top-story/parties-agree-to-bring-all-war-era-
cases-under-trc/261737.html. 
259 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “Justice for Nepal’s War-Era Victims?” The Diplomats, April 15,2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/justice-for-nepals-war-era-victims/.   
260 Ibid. 
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Cell under the Adjutant General branch on 8th July 2002,”261 The NA has adopted the 
lessons learned during the insurgency period and the CoAs has “urged his rank and file 
for the protection and promotion of human rights in any difficult and adverse 
situation.”262 Moreover, the NA has also “issued and implemented various directives, 
instructions and policies on International Human Rights Laws and International 
Humanitarian Laws.”263  
E. CONCLUSION 
During political transitions after the restoration of democracy in 1990, different 
civil society groups have significantly contributed to enhance democratic CMR in Nepal. 
The media’s effective role on informal oversight successfully pointed out the weaknesses 
in formal mechanisms of control and oversight. The media’s investigations generated 
debates among the political leaders and the policy makers. The debate further identified 
the flaws in the legal system and ambiguous provisions of the interim constitution and 
illustrated the need for reform in democratic mechanisms. Although the activities of 
Nagarik Samaj were more focused on political aspects than military affairs, this group 
contributed to the establishment of democracy and made a positive impact on constitution 
writing and policy formulation. By monitoring and investigating the cases of human 
rights violations, human rights organizations have indicated weaknesses in the 
government and the military to implement judicial procedures effectively. It not only 
identified lapses in the system, but also illustrated for the need for formal control and 
oversight mechanisms that could ensure the government and the military abide by the 
rule of law.  
After analyzing the contributions of three selected groups through the element of 
“democratic civilian control of the security forces” from Bruneau and Matei’s trinity 
framework of democratic CMR and the requirements for control mechanisms, it is found 
261 “Human Rights in NA,” Nepalese Army Home Page, accessed on, March 6, 2015, 
http://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/human_right.php. 




                                                 
that these groups significantly influenced the elements of democratic civilian control 
during the political transition in Nepal. Although, contributions of particular civil society 
groups vary from high to low (as indicated in Table 1), it could be determined that civil 
society played an effective role to enhance democratic CMR during political transitions 
in Nepal. However, political instability and a lack of consensus among the political 
leadership could not drive the country to complete democratic consolidation. Thus, 




V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis has studied the CMR in Nepal during political transitions since 
Nepal’s inception of democracy, and examined the role of civil society by selecting three 
prominent groups in shaping democratic CMR during Nepal’s democratic consolidation 
after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Nepal’s struggle in consolidating democracy 
over six decades since the inception of democracy in 1950 has increased political 
instability and shaped weak and unstable CMR. Until 2006, the king obstructed the 
consolidation by stepping into the political sphere and trying to implement an autocratic 
monarchy. Afterwards, the pursuit of consolidation has been muddled among the 
contradictory ideologies of political leaders of different parties. In addition, from 1996 to 
2006, the Maoist armed conflict also affected the process. Incomplete consolidation 
created weak democratic institutions, which exerted weak civilian control. On one hand, 
weak civilian control obstructed the smooth consolidation because the military played an 
influential role during each political transition, which partially obstructed the 
government’s efforts to strengthen democratic control mechanisms. On the other hand, 
despite civil society’s influential role during the political transition, the lack of consensus 
among the political leaders failed to consolidate the democracy.  
The long transitional period and unstable political environment led to frequent 
changes in the government, which complicated and formed unstable CMR in Nepal. In 
the period from 1950 to 2006, the activities of the king kept him at a central point and 
substantially affected CMR. As a supreme commander of the NA, he remained an 
influential actor in different forms from executive head to constitutional monarch. While 
the king remained as an executive head, he maintained the direct control of the military 
and kept the armed forces isolated from civilian authorities. The military was organized 
and developed under the king’s direct control, and civilian authorities have had no role to 
play in military affairs. This condition had great significance during the country’s 
transition because when the king curbed democratic practices, the NA remained in his 
side. Thus, activities of the king played a significant role in shaping weak and unstable 
CMR in Nepal. 
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Although executive authority was transferred to the elected body after the 
restoration of democracy in 1990, the king remained a constitutional monarch and 
constantly influenced the political system with the help of the military. The military also 
lobbied for the king to remain as supreme commander, and to give him the authority to 
approve the military’s mobilization. By accepting the military’s demand, the government 
failed to reform the old control mechanism and establish strong democratic institutions, 
which also allowed the king to maintain his relationship with the military. Because 
political leadership failed to break the link between the king and the military, this nexus 
and the king’s prerogatives continued to generate friction in CMR. In 1993, the king did 
not approve the government’s decision to mobilize the military against Maoist insurgents, 
and the military did not respond to the governments’ order. Due to the conflict with the 
king, the prime minister resigned. The problem in CMR further increased when king once 
again dismissed the democratic government in 2003, and the NA remained on the king’s 
side. Therefore, during subsequent transitions, the continuation of the traditional 
prerogatives of the king, the military’s support of the king’s activities, and weak 
democratic institutions shaped unstable CMR. 
When Nepal became a republic after the political transition of 2006, the 
contradictory ideologies of political parties’ impact on control mechanisms created 
problems in CMR. Mainly, the political polarization between the UCPM—who 
conducted on armed struggle with the aim of capturing state power, tried to accomplish 
the same mission while it headed the government—and other parties generated friction in 
CMR. The UCPM tried to influence the military toward its party’s ideology, and the 
government also sacked the COAS of the NA. Although the president overruled the 
government’s decision, it resulted in the resignation of the prime minister. This was the 
second incident in the political history of Nepal when the democratic government 
collapsed over the issue of the military control, so the emergence of friction in CMR was 
obvious. 
On the other hand, civil society played an effective role to increase the 
accountability and the transparency of the government during political transitions in 
Nepal; however, the country’s struggle to consolidate its democracy still revolves around 
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the lack of consensus among the political leaders. Although the roles of three selected 
civil society groups: the media, Nagarik Samaj, and human rights organizations were 
mainly focused on the political activities during transitional periods, these roles have had 
a significant effect in shaping democratic CMR. These groups identified gaps in existing 
control mechanisms, assisted in constitution making, and facilitated in the protection of 
human rights and the implementation of the rule of law. These contributions have had a 
substantial positive effect in establishing democratic civilian control by enhancing formal 
control mechanisms, oversight mechanisms and increasing the professional skills of the 
military.  
The media exposed the UCPM’s quest of capturing state power by controlling the 
military, which generated debate and brought positive implications for establishing 
democratic CMR. First, it indicated the need for effective control and oversight 
mechanisms to check and balance the executive from misusing his authority. Second, the 
contradiction between the prime minister and the president on existing constitutional 
provisions indicated requirements for clear legislation. In addition, the media also 
facilitated in the constitution writing process by conducting debates, and talk shows, and 
bringing related actors and the public into a common forum. Besides, the media coverage 
also softened the controversial issues such as integration of the Maoist combatants in the 
NA. 
Nagarik Samaj played two significant roles for the establishment of democracy 
during political transitions. First, it created a suitable environment for leaders including 
the UCPM, who were engaged in armed conflict, to form an alliance against the king. 
The formation of the Seven-Party Alliance was significant because the UCPM joined the 
same political system against which it was fighting. Second, Nagarik Samaj led a forum 
to motivate the people to participate in a democratic movement. Both activities acted as a 
catalyst for the establishment of democracy. After the restoration of democracy, Nagarik 
Samaj is constantly contributing in the constitution writing process by advising the 
decision makers and pressuring the government for early implementation of the 
constitution. 
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The activities of human rights organizations have been focused on incidents of 
human rights violations. These organizations exposed the incidents of human rights 
violations, investigated the cases, and helped bring the lawbreaker into the judicial 
system. By exposing the misconduct of the military and checking the implementation of 
judicial procedures, these organizations have also indicated the requirement for an 
effective control mechanism to ensure the military’s obedience. Furthermore, the 
outcome of the investigations indicated the lapses in the military’s professional 
capabilities, and the NA filled this gap by incorporating aspects of human rights in its 
educational system, which further enhanced its professional skills as well. 
Thus, it could be determined that different civil society groups significantly 
contributed to enhance democratic CMR during political transitions in Nepal; however, 
the prevailing political situation due to political instability and a lack of consensus among 
the political leadership could not drive the country from transition to consolidation. 
Moreover, incomplete consolidation created weak democratic mechanisms that could not 
exert effective control, so CMR in Nepal remained weak and unstable. Because civil 
society is not a deciding body, despite its efforts, incomplete consolidation shaped weak 
and unstable CMR in Nepal. Thus, civil society should continue its efforts and assist in 
consolidation, which would ultimately enhance democratic CMR.  
Finally, the main problems in Nepal’s transition lies in a lack of consensus among 
the leadership. At this moment, civil society needs to change its course because 
continuing similar efforts will assist in consolidation but are less likely to drive the 
country through the current political deadlock. Once again, there is a need to bring a 
radical ideological shift among the political leaders, as they did in 2006 while forming an 
alliance against the king. However, it would be difficult to unite the political leaders at 
the moment, because they do not have a common enemy. Rather, they consider each 
other enemies. Civil society’s role should focus on convincing the political leaders of a 
shared interest that writing a constitution will mark the first step of consolidation.  
Thus, Nagarik Samaj and the media must fulfill two major roles. First, launch a 
nationwide campaign to shape public opinion for consensus on conflicting arguments, 
and let the leaders listen to the people’s voice and pressure them by organizing a people’s 
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movement. Second, conduct research on those aspects of the constitution in which leaders 
lack consensus, prepare a concise paper with several alternatives and convince the 
political leadership. Because the implementation of the constitution will stabilize the 
political environment, enhance the capabilities of democratic institutions, and exert 
effective civilian control, civil society should consider the implementation of constitution 
as a beginning point to drive the country toward consolidation and enhance democratic 
CMR as well.  
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